MeiZhongTai

Signing Off

2006-03-22T19:08:00.000-05:00

MeiZhongTai is officially signing off. I hope you have enjoyed my 160 posts over the last 9 months. I have certainly enjoyed writing them. I'd like to thank all the bloggers on my blogroll and all my commenters for making this an enjoyable ride. My e-mail address will still work for anyone interested in keeping in touch.

Those mourning the loss of this source of info are encouraged to head to the other blogs in the blogroll to fill their needs.

Taiwan's MND on China's Missiles

2006-03-15T09:18:00.000-05:00

Considering the recent discussion between Dylan and I, a Taipei Times article offers some interesting new insight.

"China was producing around 50 Dong Feng [DF] series ballistic missiles annually, but ... our intelligence has found it is now increasing by 75 to 100 ballistic missiles annually," said Lieutentant Colonel Chen Chang-hwa, an intelligence analyst specializing in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) missile development, at a press conference held by the [Ministry of National Defense] yesterday.

I can't help but wonder if the "intelligence" the colonel is referring to is the Pentagon's 2005 China report which reached this same conclusion last July.*

Chen said if cruise missiles are included, China now has more than 800 missiles aimed at Taiwan

Using last year's Pentagon estimate (650-730 missiles) and predicted annual increase (75-120 missiles), China should have 725-850 missiles in a few months when the annual count is released. I'm not convinced that China reaching 800 now indicates any increase in production.

The PLA's ballistic missiles are now also more precise, according to Chen. They used to have a 600m margin of error, but that has been reduced to 50m, giving China the capability to more accurately hit Taiwan's power stations, radar bases, airstrips and military, economic and political nerve centers.

I said in my last post that I wasn't aware of anyone attributing the reduced circular error probability (margin of error) of 50 meters to the entire missile force. I stand corrected. Either the colonel has just made this claim or the reporter extrapolated the characteristics of the most accurate missiles to the whole force carelessly. I'm not ruling out the former, but also recognize the possibility of the latter.

*The Pentagon report was actually slightly more generous, saying the increase was 75-120 per annum.

Overestimating the Missile Threat

2006-03-03T10:54:00.000-05:00

Rowan Callick wrote an article entitled "China's Missile Threat 'Unstoppable'" in yesterday's The Australian claiming

The balance of terror across the Taiwan strait[...] gives China the capacity to pulverise and close down the island but not yet to invade it.

Readers of this blog (especially this post) know that China's ability to "pulverize" Taiwan is often overestimated, as it is in this article. I do, however, agree with his characterization of China's inability to invade.

Let us examine his supporting evidence:

China is capable of deploying several hundred transportable short- to medium-range ballistic missiles within a few days

With the caveat that the number of missiles deployed does not equal the number of missiles hitting their targets, I would agree.

...which could take less than five minutes to reach targets in Taiwan...

True, but not particularly relevant unless he is trying to claim that the launch sites are too close to Taiwan for Taiwan to mount an effective missile defense, an unlikely claim since it would take days to deploy them by his own estimate.

...each destroying an area of about half a city block.

If you will pardon a Clintonian moment: That depends on what your definition of "destroy" is. Or "city block" for that matter. I won't quibble, but rather clarify this point. He assumes, as I did in my own analysis of China's missile threat, that a missile will destroy all within its blast radius--a reasonable assumption if the buildings are not hardened to protect against such a blast (as many military installations surely are) and partial destruction is good enough. The lethal radius of a CSS-6 or CSS-7 is approximately 60 meters if a conventional high-explosive warhead is used, as it likely would be if the target is an urban area (a nuclear blast would obviously be a completely different situation). A radius of 60m would cover an area of 11,309m (2.79 acres). According to Wikipedia, a city block can vary from one acre to ten, so it seems his assertion, if caveated with some reasonable assumptions, is certainly reasonable.

Leading strategic expert Hugh White, a professor at the Australian National University, said yesterday that China had overtly built up its capacity to between 600 and 700 missiles to make a political point - that it would not tolerate any move by Taiwan to declare itself independent.

Reading political points into military build-ups isn't always safe, but I find this reasonable.

No missile defence system could stop them, because the numbers were so great, Professor White said. "And missile defence is a raw numbers game."

The professor is correct that Taiwan will be not be able to stop every missile, especially since at present only the northern half of the island is protected by Patriot missiles (to the best of my knowledge). Taiwan can use its Patriots to attrit those incoming missiles, reducing their destructive capacity. Lets play the "raw numbers game." My calculations of the subject tell me that accounting for mechanical malfunctions (a modest 10%), missile defenses (50% as a ball park estimate, until Taiwan runs out of missiles), and strategic reserves (1/3 seems to be the rule), about 320 missiles will hit their targets.

"The number of Chinese missiles gives Beijing a lot of political and strategic flexibility," Professor White said. "It could, for instance, fire off 20 missiles and say, 'What do you think of that?' - leaving a lot of rounds in its locker.

The problem with this is one of accuracy that is further elucidated in the following sentence:

And if China did decide it wanted to take even stronger action, it could target power stations and airstrips and ports and army barracks, and could stop Taiwan functioning for awhile."

Taiwan probably wouldn't be overly intimidated by attempts to hit specific buildings, because they would either miss the target or be so inefficient as to demonstrate the missiles' impotence. With a circular error probability of 200-280 meters, it would take 44 CSS-6s or 23 CSS-7s to destroy a target with 75% certainty, which doesn't seem to be particularly intimidating to me. Using between one out of every 30 of your missiles (or 1/15 with the less accurate missiles) to have a three-in-four chance of destroying one building won't scare anyone into submission. If China has upgraded all of its missiles with GPS-guidance systems, a technology China is rumored to be deploying on its most advanced missiles (NOT all of them), China could reasonably expect to destroy 240 non-hardened targets with its 320 missiles that reach their targets or 461 targets if no missiles were held in reserve. Once again, not particularly devastating and certainly not enough to "stop Taiwan functioning."

The author, or the professor guiding him, seems to believe that every missile China launches will hit its target. That is not a reasonable assumption. Let's hope that China is not as prone to miscalculation.

China Reports Taiwan to UN

2006-03-02T15:58:00.000-05:00

Forbes reports:

China has expressed its concerns directly to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan about Taiwan's scrapping of a unification council with the mainland, Xinhua news agency reported.

China's Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, told the UN's leadership that Taiwan was threatening to destablize the "current peaceful situation."

Forbes notes the irony:

China's direct approach to Annan and the United Nations comes despite its repeated insistence that the Taiwan issue is an internal affair and that it tolerates no interference from outside forces.

Foreign Currency Reserves

2006-02-27T22:15:00.000-05:00

An International Herald Tribune article informs us that this isn't the first time China has amassed vast foreign currency reserves by trade imbalances. (Hat tip: Economist's View)

China will soon release statistics showing that it has passed Japan as the biggest holder of foreign currency the world has ever seen. Its reserves already exceed $800 billion and are on track to reach $1 trillion by the end of the year, up from just under $4 billion in 1989. But China has held a similar position before.

Lest one should start to panic, remember that America receives more gain than pain from its trade with China.

National Unification Council

2006-02-27T19:38:00.000-05:00

There isn't anything to say about the National Unification Council that hasn't already been said by the numerous commentators around the Sinosphere:

Jerome Keating's "Inane Flap Over an Outdated and Inept National Unification Council"
Some called it a bombshell but it was only the bursting of a bubble. Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian has recently caused quite a stir among the biased and uninformed by proposing to abolish the country's ineffective National Unification Council (NUC). The continued flap over the NUC and its guidelines highlights that most people know nothing about this outdated and ineffective organization, how the guidelines themselves contradict reality, and how the council comes from an era when the Kuomintang (KMT) wished to substitute its personal agenda for that of the people of Taiwan.

Michael Turton's "NUC Scrapped"

[Taiwan] got rid of a US$32 budget item, and managed to piss off the two most powerful nations in the world. What do have for it? Anything concrete? Maybe for an encore, Chen can personally call the heads of the Hong Kong triads and tell them their wives are ugly and their children are stupid too.

David's (Jujuflop) "The NUC 'Ceases to Function'"

So does ‘cease to function’ mean that it’s been abolished? Or did it cease to function back in 2000? The answer to both these contradictary questions is probably ‘yes’. Perhaps Chen has decided that if the US is going to base their Taiwan-China policies on ’strategic ambiguity’, then there’s no reason why Taiwan can’t either.

Angry Chinese Blogger's "Independence or Bust: Brinksmanship Across the Taiwan Strait"

Under The Four Noes and One Without, Chen pledged that, so long as China did not use military force against the island, he would not[...] Nullify either the National Reunification Council or the The Guidelines for National Reunification.

Update:

Asiapundit links to assessments by Ranc and Taiwan's Other Side.
Mad Minerva is disappointed in President Chen.
China Confidential sees the situation as a failure of diplomacy.
Outside of the blogosphere, BBC has reactions from around Taiwan.
Jujuflop weighs in again.
ESWN offers the feelings of Hong Kongers.
John Tkacik indicates the Bush administration may approve of Chen's moves. (Hat Tip: Michael Turton)
ACB has a poll where you can vote on when you think President Chen will declare independence. Sadly, "Taiwan is already independent" isn't an option.

Tour of the Sinosphere

2006-02-20T14:44:00.000-05:00

The blogosphere has had an abundance of must-read articles as of late. Here are some of my favorites with a brief excerpt of each.

Jujuflop explains the friction in Taipei-Washington relations since 2000.
The majority of diplomats and Taiwan-experts in the US had regular contact with senior KMT officials and built up their relationship with the KMT. When the DPP took over power in 2000, the US suddenly found that their contacts weren’t in control, and they had to develop a whole new set of relationships.
China Confidential asks if China has a Wal-Mart problem.
China Confidential has learned that certain officials in Beijing are concerned about the ways in which Wal-Mart affects China's international image, especially in the United States, where the company has become synonymous with products--and, in the eyes of millions of Americans and many of their elected representatives--unemployment--made in China.
Michael Turton and Jerome Keating look at the Ma Ying-jeou shuffle. Michael also looks inside the KMT.

There have also been quite a few articles in the mainstream media worth a perusal.

A book review (sub. req.) of a new work by Oxford's Steve Tsang entitled If China Attacks Taiwan in the Wall Street Journal (hat tip: Michael Turton). Tsang examines the possibilities of a decapitation strike and looks at the effect a war would have on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and Asia as a whole.

Bill Gertz breaks the story of China's underground submarine facilities.

Willy Lam writes on America's role in Sino-Japanese relations. (similar to this post)

Defense News thinks America isn't being honest about its offer of submarines to Taiwan.

The National Security Council is having a tough time finding an Asia director.

Secretary Rice says Taiwan isn't doing enough to modernize its military. (hat tip: Michael Turton

Nicholas Kristof calls Yahoo, MSN, Google, and Cisco the "Gang of Four." (The Economist's View and Peking Duck have the text, the former also has humorous graphics)

Pirates Attack Great Firewall

2006-02-15T09:57:00.000-05:00

According to an article in The Guardian (also in the Taipei Times), the Chinese government is losing their battle to control information flow into China. Many previous discussions on controlling information flow, both here and around the blogosphere, have focused on the internet. This article entitled "Pirates and Bloggers Beat China's Great Wall of Propaganda" focuses primarily on movie pirates.

Pirate DVD shops might not normally be considered outposts of free expression, but they are among the many gaps in the great wall of propaganda, which is being breached by a motley crew of bloggers, copyright dodgers and curious consumers.

It seems that the Chinese are learning a lesson about trying to control markets.

The motivation is purely business, but the effect is partly political. Much of the material for sale is officially prohibited because it contradicts the government line. Among many banned items on sale is Seven Years in Tibet, in which Brad Pitt plays a character sympathetic to the Dalai Lama; Devils at the Doorstep, a film about Japanese troops in a Chinese village that won the 2000 Grand Jury prize at Cannes; and Stanley Kwan's Lan Yu, set around the 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy movement.

When there is demand, there will be supply. Markets will always arise. You could argue that the Chinese government isn't really trying that hard to stamp out these controversial pirated DVDs (after all, the article cites the piracy police themselves buying pirated discs), but that doesn't really matter since all they can really hope to do is make the disc slightly more expensive, not wipe out its sale.

All in all, this article is worth a look just because it is a much more optimistic (from the perspective of freedom and the consumer) take on censorship than most other articles on the subject.

Updates:

The American State Department aims to make the work of China's internet censors just a little bit harder with the creation of its Global Internet Freedom Task Force.
Imagethief looks at the Chinese response from a PR perspective.

Sheep in Wolf's Clothing

2006-02-14T17:05:00.000-05:00

Kuomintang (KMT) chairman Ma Ying-jeou gave a speech in London last weekend that has shaken up the KMT line on China.

China must agree to discuss dismantling its missiles pointing at Taiwan before talks can be held, Kuomintang Chairman Ma Ying-jeou said in comments aired Saturday by Taiwan's ETTV Station.

Michael Turton has been covering the original comments and the backtracking since.

My question is: Was Ma just hoping to portray himself as a centrist to get elected President in 2008 or is he actually moving in that direction? As odd as it may seem, the idea that China should stop openly threatening the existance of Taiwan is a pretty controversial stance for a KMT politician.

A comment by David of Jujuflop on Michael's first post is worth repeating here:

Some of the statements that Ma has been making would be impossible for CSB to make without getting accused of trying to block talks with China (Ma has also said that PRC would have to admit to and apologise for Tiananmen before any talks about unification).

This is certainly an interesting situation and worth keeping an eye on.

How to Misunderstand Your Neighbor

2006-02-14T16:07:00.000-05:00

Monday, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) hosted a talk entitled "How to Misunderstand Your Neighbor" in its beautiful Wohlstetter Conference Center in Northwest Washington (it was advertised under the title "Troubled Ties"). The presenter was Akira Chiba, assistant press secretary for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who has recently authored a book by the same name on Sino-Japanese relations.* Mr. Chiba served six years in Japan's embassy in Beijing in various posts and is fluent in Chinese (in addition to English, Russian, French, Spanish, German, and obviously Japanese).

AEI invited Bojiang Yang (Brookings) and Randall Schriver (Armitage International, CSIS) as discussants for the Chinese and American perspective respectively. Dan Blumenthal of AEI served as the moderator.

Chiba's presentation was quite similar to a series of letters between he and Lanxin Xiang (Professor, Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva) on Sino-Japanese relations published in the journal Survival (Summer, 2005). That fifteen page exchange does a far better job summing up the issue than I could hope to do here, so if you have access to Survival, give that a read.

Akira Chiba
Chiba's PowerPoint presentation began with a discussion of the history and strength of the relationship between China and Japan. Japan and China currently have the largest bilateral trade of any two countries in the region. Japan is the largest source of official development aid (ODA) to China. The numbers of foreign direct investment, exchange students, and sister city relationships are also impressive and expanding.

Second, he addressed Japan's role in World War II and its contrition in the years since. Japan paid for its aggression with lives (those executed or imprisoned for life as a result of the war crimes trials) and with its checkbook (Japan paid close to 20 billion USD in reparations). Japan, as a country, has apologized numerous times, most importantly the 15 August 1995 statement of then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. Mr. Chiba also spoke of Prime Minster Junichiro Koizumi's 2001 visit to the Marco Polo Bridge Anti-War Museum (I'm not sure of the museum's exact name), where he bowed deeply.

Third, Chiba spoke to Chinese perception of Japan. He cited a recent survey showing that roughly 75% of Chinese people admitted to a negative perception of Japan. He pointed out that 71% of the same didn't know Japan provided ODA to China and many didn't even know that Japan is a democracy.

To clarify this point he spoke to what he calls "one-way mirrors," the reasons that China and Japan have a hard time understanding one another and often speak past each other. Most important of those "one-way mirrors" is the Chinese tendency to think in terms of dialectics, while Japanese tend to thing in idealistic terms. Additionally, China maintains "politics in command" (a rally cry from the Cultural Revolution), while Japanese, on the other hand, are "order freaks" who never run red lights. Additionally, Chinese tend to be atheists while Japanese tend to be pantheists (Shinto) and the Chinese prefer a linear outlook of history while the Japanese history books favor a cyclical outlook.

Fourth, he spoke about historical discrepancies (like the number of Japanese soldiers killed in the World War II battle of Taierzhuang), differences in how Japanese and Chinese people treat historical figures viewed as traitors, and different notions of the meaning of some Hanzi/Kanji characters and the resulting disagreements on translations (relevant because of disagreements over words like "apology" and "soothing the souls," which is the rationale for visiting the Yasukuni Shrine).

Perhaps most controversially, he pointed out that foreign protest over visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine only began in 1985, even though the burial of Class A war criminals there had been revealed in 1979 and the Prime Minister visited numerous times in the interim. He found no correlation between visits by the leadership to the shrine and militarism (which he measured by Japanese defense expenditures) over the years.

In conclusion, he said that small gestures (like a well dedication that he attended in China because it was funded with Japanese ODA) are a good starting point to build a better relationship between China and Japan.

Bojiang Yang
Mr. Yang agreed with Chiba on the importance of the relationship between their two countries and that the nations were often divided by their common written language (he offered an example of a word which is read as "writing a letter" in one language and "toilet paper" in the other).

He opined that it has taken thirty years for normalization to occur between the two countries and it will take thirty more years for normalization to occur between the two societies.

Yang rebutted Chiba's attempts to explain the Yasukuni Shrine controversy as a misunderstanding of Shintoism. He pointed out that the shrine was used before World War II to mobilize the people for war.

Due to differing international situations, he said comparisons between the visits of Prime Ministers Yasuhiro Nakasone and Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine were inappropriate. This seems to support the notion that the shrine visits (and the resulting protests) are a symptom or symbol of the problem, not the cause itself--an assertion Yang himself made later in the discussion.

He then concluded with three key points:

Sino-Japanese relations must be viewed in the strategic context of a growing China. Just over a decade ago China's economy was one-tenth the size of Japans. Today it is closer to one-third. Due to China's relative growth and the expanding interests of both countries, friction is inevitable.

Domestic political agents must be considered when hoping for a breakthrough in relations between the two countries. Yang said he was especially hopeful after September of this year. While he did not explain his rationale for increased hope after September, there is little doubt that he was referring to Koizumi's planned retirement that month.

The United States has a role in Sino-Japanese relations. The size of the Japanese economy, importation of foreign rice, and American policies have played a role in each of the three waves of Japanese nationalism (early 1960s, early 1980s, and current).

Randall Schriver
Mr. Schriver began by thanking the moderator for arranging for him to speak last because this is an issue for Japan and China to work out, not America's problem. Having said that, he admitted that America always meddles and therefore offered his thoughts as to what role America should play.

First, Schriver countered the arguments one sometimes hears that Sino-Japanese tension is good for America. It keeps China occupied and Japan on its toes, the argument goes. Schriver said for for that "logic train" to work, one had to believe that the American foreign policy apparatus is deft enough to maintain just the right amount of tension (as war is in no one's interest) and he wasn't sure that was the case.

Second, America should not try to maintain neutrality in the issue or treat both sides equally. There is no reason for America to be apologetic about the close nature of its relationship with Japan. America should work to strengthen that alliance and to convey the message:

We have full faith and confidence in our friends in Japan.

Third, America should try to disaggregate the problems. On one hand, America should stay away from historical issues because of their sensitive and emotional nature. America wouldn't appreciate other countries meddling in the writing of its own history, after all. On the other hand, America has a clear role to play in working with Japan to improve crisis management and thus reducing the risk of unnecessary escalation.

Audience Q&A
Two particularly interesting questions were asked. The first came from the moderator, who asked about the common perception in Japan that Japan is a Chinese scapegoat. No matter what Japan does, the harassment from China will not cease, the logic goes, because China will continue to need an outlet for the people's frustration. Chiba, who had addressed the issue in a previous article, said that the view is common but that he does not necessarily share that belief himself. Yang countered that the argument implies that the legitimacy of the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is in doubt. In fact, he argued, the CCP has significantly widened its constituent base and thus is stable enough that it would have no need for a whipping boy.

The second question came from Chris Nelson, whose affiliation I did not catch. He spoke to a recent discussion between the editors of the the Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun. They concluded that the government should construct a depoliticized war site that the Prime Minister and others could visit without raising the ire of the victims of past Japanese militarism. Mr. Nelson asked the speakers their thoughts on the proposal. Chiba replied that it was unworkable because the government cannot tell the shrine what to do. Government interference in religious affairs had created trouble in the past and should thus be avoided. Schriver stated his belief that Japan could best work through its history and have a thoughtful debate (such as the one that occured between the editors) on the subject without outside interference.

Related News from China Confidential:

*Mr. Chiba's book is available in Japanese or Chinese, but not in English.

PLAN a Factor for USN Planning

2006-02-08T00:08:00.000-05:00

The Congressional Research Service's Ronald O'Rourke wrote "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities" (pdf) last November in response to widespread concern on Capitol Hill and elsewhere in the U.S. government. O'Rourke has written widely on American defense requirements, especially as it relates to the Navy, making this report well-worth a read.

China has come up repeatedly in congressional debate over the size of the Navy. The 288-ship fleet of today is half the size it was three decades ago. "You never want to broadcast to the world that something’s insufficient," [Senator John] Warner says, "but clearly China poses a challenge to the sizing of the U.S. Navy." [1]

I won't seek to summarize this lengthy and detail-packed report, but rather will offer a few hand-picked facts that I found to be of particular interest:

China appears to be developing short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) capabilities that would potentially allow them to target naval vessels. (I previously posted on China's SRBMs as relevant to land-attack missions but did not include a naval analysis.)

China may have advanced Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) that are somewhat effective against "stealthy" aircraft. (I previously posted on China's ability to detect American stealth aircraft, but didn't analyze the kill capability that is needed to operationalize that information.)

China's submarine acquisition will soon surpass the previous average of one per annum.
China will have a net gain of 35 submarines over the next 15 years. [9]

John Tkacik of Heritage is cited offering a new translation of ShaShouJian: "Poisoned Arrow" (9). I would argue it isn't a particularly accurate translation, see here for more.

O'Rourke quotes heavily from a fascinating article in Signal:
It is unlikely that Russian advisers would be onboard [Russian-made Sovremnyi and Kilos] during actual combat operations against Taiwan and U.S. Navy air, surface and subsurface threats. PLAN officers and crew are not expected to be able to handle operations when under fire, sustaining hits and suffering system degradation or loss. [21]
I hadn't yet seen this argued. Provocative thought worthy of further study. That same article addresses China's "Aegis-like" systems.

In terms of what all this means for the US Navy:

A key potential issue for Congress in assessing the adequacy of the Navy’s ship force structure plan is whether it includes enough ships to address potential challenges posed by China’s naval modernization while also meeting other responsibilities, including maintaining forward deployments of Navy ships in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region and the Mediterranean Sea and conducting less-frequent operations in other parts of the world, such as the Caribbean, the waters around South America, and the waters off West Africa. If increased numbers of Navy ships are needed to address potential challenges posed by China’s naval modernization, fewer ships might be available for meeting other responsibilities. [40]

He also addresses how many carriers, submarines, etc. the USN needs and how many of those should be forward-deployed in the Pacific.

The Science Threat

2006-02-06T23:18:00.000-05:00

Washington Post columnist Sebastian Mallaby writes of "The Fake Science Threat" (mirrored by French, hat tip to SimonWorld). He argues that worries of competitiveness with China in math and science is misdirected.

The science lobby should also stop pretending that countries compete the same way companies do. Firms such as Toyota and Ford really do go head-to-head against each other; if Toyota has superior technology, it will steal Ford's customers -- and Ford may even disappear. But if China produces Nobel-quality science, it won't put the United States out of business; rather, Chinese discoveries will help American scientists discover more, too. Equally, Toyota doesn't sell cars to Ford workers, so there's no benefit to Ford's people if Toyota's quality advances. But China does sell to Americans, so whatever makes it more productive has some upside for the United States as well.

Hollow Threat
Science needn't always be a competition. Mallaby is correct that international economics differs from economics of corporations. International economics is not a zero-sum game and therefore an advancement in one country can bring about advancements for all. In addition to economic considerations, the same argument works for medicine. If a cure for AIDS is discovered it won't matter one iota where it was first discovered.

The type of scientific discovery that wins Nobel prizes and is discussed by Mallaby involves publishing in academic journals. That type of advance quickly spreads beyond national boundaries. The economic growth brought about by such scientific advances results more from the diffusion of the advance than the discovery itself. America needn't fear this type of competition. No matter where the advance occurs, America is well-prepared to take maximum advantage.

But...
There are more ways than one to apply scientific advances. Not all science is intended to spawn economic growth. One other pursuit that is heavily dependent on scientific advances is military weaponry. The research, development, and acquisition of new weapon systems is heavily dependent on scientists and a technological edge can make the difference between victory and defeat. Unlike medical or commercial technologies, scientific progress with likely military application is not usually published in open-source journals. Much military research is secret and therefore relying on foreigners to conduct the research might not be possible/advisable, thus in large part negating the oft-proposed immigration solution.

If America loses its edge in science and engineering education, its military edge is likely to follow. I'll leave it to Thomas Friedman and William Odom to debate whether or not we are losing our high-technology edge, but to argue that such an erosion is not potentially threatening is to not consider the issue fully.

QDR Reviewed

2006-02-06T16:39:00.000-05:00

The Quadrennial Defense Review has been reviewed in its entirety by numerous experts and writers (DefenseTech.org has a roundup). Bloggers have also been busy on the subject (Blog Search). Due to the narrow focus of this blog, I only seek to review the document's conclusions that are relevant to China or Taiwan, much in the way China Confidential has done:

A major policy document published by the United States Defense Department on Friday identifies China as the emerging world power most likely to threaten US status as the world's only superpower. More important, perhaps, the document calls for several steps to counter that potential threat.

Especially relevant to China watchers are pages 27-31 of the report. That section focuses on the third of four priorities listed in the document: "Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads." While the rest of the document focuses largely on the new stragegic environment where threats come from "decentralized network threats from non-state enemies" and asymmetric threats, this section deals with deterrence, including that tailored for "near-peer competitors" (I guess using such obvious, yet indirect wording to refer to China is really no different than China and Russia using the supposedly generic title of "hegemon" to refer circuitously to the United States).

And how does the United States hope to influence Chinese decision-making?

U.S. policy seeks to encourage China to choose a path of peaceful economic growth and political liberalization, rather than military threat and intimidation. The United States’ goal is for China to continue as an economic partner and emerge as a responsible stakeholder and force for good in the world. (29)

Such a goal should come as a surprise to noone. America's desire to shape Chinese decision-making faces a great challenge, it would appear:

The outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making or of key capabilities supporting its military modernization.

Strengthening America's ability to deter (and if that should fail, to win) conflicts involves strengthening partnerships with allies, altering its basing in accordance with the Global Defense Posture Review (explained here), and "prompt and high-volume global strike" capabilities (presumably long-range bombers, SSGNs, etc.). Also mentioned is an increase in language training, further explained on pages 78-79 of the report, including Mandarin Chinese.

Conclusion
There is really nothing new in this report, at least nothing that is relevant to China. For someone who hasn't followed the U.S. military and needs to be brought up to speed, this document might be useful. For someone who watches the news regularly and pays attention to the acquisitions and reforms underway in the Defense Department, this report is just more of the same. Forthcoming "follow-on roadmaps" will further explain some aspects of the report, including irregular warfare and intelligence, may offer new insight into those fields.

For an alternate view of what the Quadrennial Defense Review should say, see the Center for American Progress's report (pdf). They are much more pessimistic about Iraq and Afghanistan and declare the Raptor, Virginia-class submarine, DD(X) Destroyer, and some other weapon systems unnecessary. On the subject of China:

Ultimately, China will pursue its own strategic interests with or without U.S. support, and the United States will need to be prepared for conflict with China if necessary. (15)

New Reports

2006-02-03T16:00:00.000-05:00

The Department of Defense has released the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Rumors have been floating around for days that the report would focus more on China than the Global War on Terror or the Iraq War.

Another report recently released and no doubt of interest to this blog's target audience is from RAND, who bring a can-do attitude and see "A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry (pdf)." (Hat Tip: Michael Turton).

A little older, but also of interest is a report by the Congressional Research Service's Ronald O'Rourke's "China Naval Modernization: Implication for U.S. Naval Capability (pdf)."

I hope to find time to read and comment on at least the first of these reports. Due to computer problems, I have not yet been able to do so.

Nothing to Fear But...

2006-01-29T00:34:00.000-05:00

Long time readers of MeiZhongTai will remember the attempts of the ROC Army and Air Force to sink a wounded South Korean freighter that was leaking benzene. My take on the situation was that it was in some ways a better display of ROC military proficiency than the scripted exercises performed for the press. SimonWorld brings us news from the other side of the Taiwan Strait that can be seen as comparable.

In a post titled "Fear Not the Red Dragon,"Simon brings us this from the unlinkable South China Morning Post:

the Red Army troops were defeated because the army commander forgot to call in air support.

The obvious conclusion here is that PLA commanders are incompetent. Forgetting to call in air support is a pretty bonehead move, after all. A possible alternate explanation is that the PLA is moving toward more authentic training, which is resulting in bonehead moves being exposed (and presumably corrected) instead of hidden, where they are likely to be repeated.

I'm guessing that none of the commanders in the ROC's most recent Han Kuang exercise forgot to call air support... because no phone call was required. It was decided in advance that the air support would arrive at a set time. In the long run, which country is going to end up with a more potent fighting force, the country who allows their officers to fail under more authentic circumstances and then motivates (humiliates) them to improve or the one that scripts everything so that problems are never exposed in the first place? While it is embarassing that this officer made such a blatant mistake, the fact that the mistake was caught shows some commitment to improving. I hope the ROC military is taking note of this. I for one would welcome more failure in the next Han Kuang exercise. That exercise would benefit Taiwan the most if it would just lose the exercise honestly.

[China] [Taiwan]

Taiwan's Defense Needs

2006-01-28T23:53:00.000-05:00

There has long been talk of exactly what weaponry Taiwan needs for its self-defense. Some outsiders view the Taiwanese government as one entity who isn't taking its own defense seriously, e.g., Ted Galen Carpenter. Others look deeper into the politics and weapon systems for explanation.

Party Politics
While observers disagree as to the rationale, the Blues clearly are obstructing the purchase of the arms offered Taiwan by the United States. The old refrain was that unless the (Green-led) government was planning to provoke China by declaring independence, only minimal defensive arms would be needed to defend the island because China isn't particularly threatening. Eventually this line of reasoning faded, and the Blues began to debate about the specific weapons.

The Arms Package
In 2001 the Bush administration offered to Taiwan diesel submarines, anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and Patriot missile batteries in response to a request from the earlier (KMT) Taiwanese leadership. Most controversial of the three pieces has been the submarines, as the United States doesn't have eight diesel submarines to offer or the facilities to produce such craft. Equally troubling, all three pieces of the arms package appear to be significantly overpriced. Due to international political constraints, Taiwan is prevented from much in the way of comparison shopping.

Are these weapons appropriate for Taiwan's needs or is Taiwan only considering their purchase as part of a protection scheme? The answer seems to be that the submarines would be nice if Taiwan had unlimited funds for defense but the money could be much more efficiently and effectively spent elsewhere (this argument has been made by Michael Turton with Admiral Eric McVadon and anonymous PACOM officers singing backup (after quite a bit of debate, I even came around to agree with the experts).

While naval mines and other weapons have been mentioned, the most common weapon system cited as a more productive use of Taiwanese defense dollars has been fighter aircraft. The blogosphere has been aflutter with news on this front in the last few days. Particularly interesting have been posts by Michael and Jason about Taiwan's stated interest in the Joint Strike Fighter or other aircraft with Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) capability.

Conclusion
Whatever becomes of this arms package, it is important to not judge the ROC military or the commitment of Taiwan to its own defense solely by this one package. As Gary Schmitt and Dan Blumenthal have pointed out, not wanting some overpriced submarines is not the same as free-riding or lacking commitment to one's own self-defense. The government is doing its best to whip up support for arms acquisitions after all even if it does seem to be taking a page from the duct-tape-as-a-defense-against-terrorism school of defense with proposals for a strategic quick-drying cement stockpile.

[China] [Taiwan]

America's Coming War With China

2006-01-26T19:56:00.000-05:00

The much blogged about (1, 2, 3) CATO book talk to mark the release of Ted Galen Carpenter's America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course Over Taiwan took place Wednesday at the CATO offices in Washington D.C.

Joining Mr. Carpenter on the stage were moderator Chris Preble (CATO) and China experts Richard Bush (Brookings) and Clyde Prestowitz (Economic Strategy Institute) with the latter two offering comments on Mr. Carpenter's book. The roster of attendees reads like a who's who of China and national security scholars as well as policy and defense practitioners. For those who were unable to attend and don't wish to watch the video in its entirety, a summary and discussion of the points raised follows. It needs stating that these comments are based on the notes I took during the talk and I am unable to double-check their veracity against the video due to a slow internet connection.

Carpenter
After a brief introduction by Chris Preble, Carpenter explained the conclusions outlined in his book. If the United States, the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan all continue on their present courses, war is almost certain within the next decade.

Taiwanese public opinion is shifting in favor of independence as demonstrated by the oft-cited public opinion polls on self-identification and feelings toward reunification, independence, and the status quo. China is becoming increasingly impatient in its wait for reunification and less satisfied with the status quo as shown by China's 2000 Defense White Paper and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. Finally America's Taiwan Strait policy of strategic ambiguity relies on convincing China we would defend Taiwan were it attacked and convincing Taiwan that we would not (to oversimplify the matter criminally) could potentially be read the exact opposite way. Due to these trends a costly war is likely and ten years down the road the balance of power may have shifted to the extent that American victory would not be assured, Carpenter asserts.

As the United States has limited control over Chinese or Taiwanese foreign policy, averting conflict can only occur by shifting American policy in Carpenter's view. Therefore, he recommends that the American policymakers view Taiwan as but a peripheral issue to the United States, not the vital concern it is often characterized as. As such, America should continue selling defensive arms to Taiwan to allow it to defend itself but explicitly rescind any American security guarantee to the island. To put it simply, we care about Taiwan enough to sell them arms but not enough to put American sons and daughters in harm's way.

Bush
Richard Bush, author of At Cross Purposes and Untying the Knot, offered three comments in response to Carpenter's book and talk. First, Bush agrees that there is a significant danger of war due to miscalculation in spite of the growing economic interdependence between the three economies. He feels that any miscalculation is more likely to result from a failure of the leaders in Taipei or Beijing to understand the decision-making of the other capital's leaders than from any ambiguity related to American foreign policy.

Second, having been a representative of American foreign policy in Taiwan, Mr. Bush contended that American policy hasn't been nearly as ambiguous as Carpenter suggests. He cautioned Carpenter that American policy can not be interpreted solely based on public pronouncements, rather one must realize that much of the communication occurs in private consultations with senior leaders on both sides. To illustrate his points, Bush pointed out that Chinese defense acquisitions indicate that China believes the United States would intervene in a conflict. Additionally, in his talks with senior defense and policy leaders in Taiwan, he noticed little confusion as to American policy.

Third, Bush offered some policy concerns in the form of questions.

Can Taiwan afford the weapon systems necessary to defend itself against a Chinese attack?
Would Taiwan have time to build up its defense capabilities before being abandoned by the United States?
Is there American public or policymakers support for such a shift in foreign policy?
If the US abandoned Taiwan, would that cause Taiwan to seek nuclear weapons? How would the United States respond if Taiwan were to acquire nukes?
Would abandoning Taiwan cause Taipei to sue for peace immediately?
Shouldn't we include Taiwan and the Taiwanese people in the decision-making process?
How would such a move effect American security?

Prestowitz
Avoiding a war with China (either hot or cold) and bringing China completely into the global system is a vital national interest of the United States, pointed out Clyde Prestowitz, the author of Three Billion New Capitalists. Is defense of Taiwan as vital a national interest? When deciding whether or not to extend a security guarantee to Taiwan, America must consider the relative importance of these goals and decide what America is willing to sacrifice in defense of Taiwan. Prestowitz used an uninhabited Hawaiian island as an analogy to point out that Taiwan means a lot more to China than it does to America.

In closing, Prestowitz recommended that if America truly wants to engage China and include it fully in the globalized interconnected world, America should strengthen its commitment to globalization. During the question and answer session, Prestowitz further elaborated on this point saying,

If you want democracy in China, uncensor Google.

Rebuttal
In response to the comments offered by Bush and Prestowitz, Carpenter offered three points. He replied to Bush's question about Taiwan's ability to defend itself by admitting he didn't know if Taiwan was capable or not but argued that the Taiwanese legislature would act more "responsibly" if it lacked an American security guarantee. In reply to Bush's question as to the political support within the US for such a move, Carpenter admitted a policy change was unlikely, especially because of Taiwan's democratization, but argued it is too dangerous for the United States to fight China over the island. Finally, in response to Prestowitz's comments/question as to the relative importance of Taiwan to China and the United States, Carpenter agreed that Taiwan was vastly more important to China, pointing out that when a security guarantee is offered one must consider not only the balance of power, but also the balance of fervor, by which he means the intensity of commitment to the cause being fought for.

Q & A Session
Questions were offered by Mark Stokes, Eric McVadon, and Parris Chang among others. One of the more interesting questions came from a representative of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, who pointed out the strategic importance of Taiwan due to its proximity to sea lanes vital to South Korea and Japan. The answer came that if the waterways are important to those countries, let them defend it. In response to a similar question that followed, Mr. Bush commented that adopting Carpenter's advice would likely profoundly effect the alliance between the US and Japan. Mr. Prestowitz countered that the Japanese have never understood the American commitment to Taiwan, pointing out that they would much prefer America focusing its defensive efforts on their island.

In a query sure to warm the hearts of Michael Turton and others, Eric McVadon of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis asked if the oft-discussed offer of arms to Taiwan in 2001 (diesel submarines, anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and missile defense batteries) represented the best package of weapons for Taiwanese defense needs. Carpenter responded that while diesel submarines might not be the best use of defense dollars, the KMT has not accepted a downsized package either but seems content to simply stonewall the entire package.

Parris Chang accused Carpenter of unfairly placing blame for the friction between China and the US at the feet of Taiwan, asking if the panelists felt that all disagreements between the two powers would disappear in Taiwan's absence. He also commented that Taiwan was not the provocateur in the matter as it is China pointing 800 missiles at Taiwan, not the other way around. Because his sentiments were worded as statements more than questions, his concerns went largely unanswered by the panelists.

Analysis
Carpenter's conclusion that America should abandon its security guarantee to Taiwan is not surprising considering his position as the Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank. Libertarians tend to favor cutting of security guarantees and adopting a foreign policy of "restraint," which is to say a military retrenchment like the one advocated in Dr. Eugene Gholz's "Come Home America" (International Security, Spring 1997). The problem with this policy is the same today as when George McGovern first proposed it, the American people will not accept an amoral foreign policy. From a purely Realist position, accommodating the rising superpower might be wise and offering up Taiwan would be accommodation par excellance. There is little support in the American collective heart, however, for giving up on the 23 million free people of Taiwan. America claims to stand for the promotion of democracy and liberal institutions. While sometimes America has retreated from its vanguard position in the name of Realpolitik, surrendering Taiwan to a rising China would be a bridge too far. As long as there is support in America for a foreign policy based on more than pure self-interest, there will be support for assisting Taiwan in its defense.

Update:

Dignified Rant views Taiwan as a "canary in the coal mine."

I argue in the comments that if you add up those who feel we should support Taiwan because of past promises, those who think we should support Taiwan because it is a liberal democracy facing threat from a country who is not, and those who think we should defend Taiwan lest it become an hor d'oeuvres to the growing apetite of China, we will have reached the critical mass of popular support necessary to require action by the US government.

[China] [Taiwan]

2006: Same as 2005

2006-01-13T11:20:00.000-05:00

The Economist has released its Big Mac Index for 2006. The Chinese yuan is 59% undervalued compared to the dollar. This is the same estimate as last year, so I will refrain from interpretting it, opting instead to point you to last year's analysis. So much for China's famed 2% revaluing of the yuan.

Other highlights of the 2006 Big Mac Index:

The Swiss Franc is once again the most overvalued currency against the dollar. (57% this year versus 65% in 2005)

The New Taiwan Dollar is undervalued by 25% (versus 21% in 2005).

The Euro is overvalued by 11% (down from 17%).

For those interested in the Chinese economy, The New Economist offers a roundup of must-read articles.

[China] [Big Mac Index]

Marquand on Arms

2006-01-10T11:07:00.000-05:00

Robert Marquand of the Christian Science Monitor has a piece in today's paper on Taiwan's proposed arms purchase.

In a bid to rally Taiwan's flagging independence forces, President Chen Shui-bian's New Year's resolution seems to be provoking mainland China with a push announced this week to buy US arms, including eight submarines and a dozen sub-hunting aircraft.

A couple of questions come to mind:

Are "indepence forces" really flagging?
If it is a New Year's resolution, shouldn't it be somehow different from what he did last year?

While I liked some of his previous work, Marquand really starts off this article on the wrong foot. He then continues by discussing China's arms build-up (obviously aimed at Taiwan). Since when is defending one's country against a growing threat a provocation? I understand the idea of the security dilemma as well as the next guy, but this is ridiculous. Having a 55 submarine force (China) is okay, but trying to acquire eight submarines is a provocation? Can someone explain this to me?

He spends the rest of the article offering alternatives to the current arms deal of submarines, sub-hunting aircraft, and missile defense batteries.

Instead of spending huge sums on a diesel-electric sub that would take at least a decade to deploy, for example, they point to other measures that could be taken, including hardening airfields, buying antiaircraft missiles, and protecting electronic systems needed in a fight. Instead of procuring expensive and vulnerable warships, Taiwan could buy mines that would deny the Chinese Army an easy landing on island beaches.

While he makes some good recommendations (many of which have been made here before by commenters) I guess my concern is that after his opening, I'm not convinced he has Taiwan's best interests at heart.
His finale:

Another reason the Pentagon now balks at advanced weapons to Taiwan: Worry that they would slip into the hands of China's Army.

I notice Marquand has no attribution attached to that sentence. I'd be curious as to the origin of that sentence. Is it Marquand's own editorializing?

[China] [Taiwan]

Military News

2006-01-09T11:02:00.000-05:00

Some interesting stories on Chinese and Taiwanese military forces in the news as of late. Troops, submarines, and missiles. A little something for everyone.

The People's Liberation Army continues to decrease in size relative to its sister services. This is a vital part of modernizing Chinese armed forces. The downside for the government is that it increases already high unemployment.
At the end of 2005, China completed the task of trimming the ranks of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by 200,000, bringing its total number of troops to 2.3 million. [Xinhua]

The KMT is characterizing the eight diesel submarines offered Taiwan by the United States as offensive weapons, and thus inappropriate for the ROC military. [Taipei Times]
KMT:
Taiwan should boost its defensive capabilities and aim to survive a `first strike' during a Chinese military attack. It is not necessary to spend huge amounts of money on offensive submarines.

DPP:
[B]ecause of China's sparse anti-submarine warfare capabilities, Beijing would have to spend around eight times the amount spent on Taiwan's submarine force to build up adequate capabilities, including procuring anti-submarine aircraft, minesweepers, mine-sweeping helicopters, anti-submarine missiles and destroyers. Therefore, the move would distract China from concentrating on its offensive capabilities.

The supposedly non-partisan editor of Taiwan Defense Review:
The KMT wants Taiwan to take a beating from China

Speaking of offensive weapons, Jane's Defense Weekly reports Taiwan will soon begin deploying Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles capable of striking China's east coast. Earlier, I was unclear whether the HS-IIE was a land attack or anti-ship cruise missile. After further consideration, it is likely both, since there is only minimal difference between them, much like the Exocet and Harpoon can be launched from numerous platforms.

Update: Brian Dunn critiques a piece on the above-mentioned missiles that has earned the title "most twisted analysis yet."

[China] [Taiwan]

Heritage Rankings

2006-01-08T14:05:00.000-05:00

The Heritage Foundation recently released its rankings of economic freedom. Of some relevance to this blog: Hong Kong ranked number one (most free economy), Taiwan ranked 37, and China tied Zambia at 111 out of 157 economies graded. The blogosphere has been abuzz since the rankings were released.

Firing the first shot was Sun Bin, who noted that Taiwan has dropped in the rankings since President Chen Shui-bian took office and that Hong Kong has not dropped since the island reverted to PRC control. Specifically, he faults Chen for attempting "active management" of the economy (which results in a low rank for government intervention in the Heritage rankings).

Asiapundit followed-up on Sun Bin's post with a discussion of who, if anyone, deserves the title "communist" out of the CCP, KMT, and DPP.

Michael Turton fired back with a history lesson and charges of an ideological slant.

Heritage's ideas of what constitutes "intervention" are strongly value-laden... In sum, the report's methodology is highly slanted, selective, and obviously right-wing.

Finally, Simon World brings us an article by Jake van der Kamp pointint out that Hong Kong is not the world's freest economy, Somalia is.

We [Hong Kong] have our rating, largely thanks to the approach the foundation has taken, which, whether deliberately or not, happens to emphasise foreign trade and foreign investment over domestic economic considerations. We fit that cookie cutter perfectly.

[Heritage] [Hong Kong] [Taiwan]

New Year in Politics

2006-01-03T17:35:00.000-05:00

China's President Hu Jintao marked the arrival of the new year with a speech reemphasizing his commitment to the One China policy. Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian replied with his thoughts on his island's relationship with China.

President Chen Shui-bian said Sunday that Taiwan needed to increase its weapons purchases and warned against greater economic ties to the mainland.

The market responded negatively to Chen's speech.

Michael Turton of The View From Taiwan highlights some particularly good reporting on Taiwan as of late, including the International Herald Tribune article linked above. Especially noteworthy is the portion of the IHT article noting that Chen's policies have not changed. For that matter neither have Hu's.

One thing that has changed is the arms available to Taiwan. This could potentially unfreeze the stalled arms purchase bill and result in a better mix of weapons available to the ROC armed forces.

Update: It now appears there has been no change in the arms sale.

[China] [Taiwan]

Anti-Censorship

2006-01-03T16:41:00.000-05:00

News broke a few days ago that Michael Anti's blogs (Chinese and English) have disappeared from the blogosphere. He had recently taken up the cause of the reporters and editors at the Beijing Daily News. Rebecca MacKinnon has concluded that it was his blog service provider, Microsoft's MSN Spaces, not the Great Firewall of China that killed his blog. Anti has now returned to Blog City (English, Chinese) which is blocked throughout China, likely because of Anti's blog previously hosted there.

In a similar line of thought, John Pasden of Sinosplice wonders why the prominent bridge blog EastSouthWestNorth has never been blocked inside China. A dialogue between Pasden and Roland Soong of ESWN is here with additional comments from Soong here. It is an interesting case study of who gets blocked and who doesn't and guesses as to why.

[Censorship] [China]

China's New Great Leap

2005-12-30T15:39:00.000-05:00

Angry Chinese Blogger has reviewed the Hudson Institute's report "China's New Great Leap Forward" (PDF). I normally like to review reports like this, as I did with 2005 reports by the Pentagon and the China Commission, but ACB has done so well that another recap and/or deconstruction isn't needed.
Excerpt:

Delivering its 95 page report, titled: “China's New Great Leap Forward: High Technology and Military Power in the Next Half-Century”, the Hudson Institute warned Washington that the 'comfort zone' of technological and strategic superiority that has always existed between China's large, but unsophisticated, military, and America's own armed forces, is not only far smaller than previously thought, but that is shrinking at an alarming rate due to the rapid modernization of both China's military strategies, and its domestic R&D capabilities.

[China] [Taiwan]

New Sub Supporter

2005-12-29T19:03:00.000-05:00

Some of you may remember that one month ago, I changed my position on Taiwan's purchase of eight diesel submarines from the United States. Having previously defended the purchase as necessary for security, I switched sides due to cost ineffectiveness. Brian Dunn of the Dignified Rant is now assuming the mantle of leadership in defense of the submarines.

[MeiZhongTai's] analysis ignores the fact that China's subs are on average, quite poor and poorly trained as well. They rarely put to sea and usually do so with the company of surface ships just in case. I sincerely doubt that the PLAN could put 16 effective attack submarines to sea to sink the 8 proposed Taiwanese boats under debate.

Dunn then goes on to ponder how plausible deniability might fit in to undersea warfare in the Taiwan Strait. Give it a read and since Dignified Rant doesn't appear to have comments enabled, feel free to discuss the merits of the various positions in the comments section of this post.

Sino-Japanese Relations

2005-12-29T14:58:00.000-05:00

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi recently spoke to the importance of the relationship between Japan and China, calling both the People's Republic and South Korea "important and friendly neighbors" of Japan. Observers of relations between China and Japan might disagree with Koizumi's use of the adjective 'friendly.'

The Chinese animosity toward Japan dating back to World War II and fanned by the Chinese Communist Party is not a new thing. Neither is the rising nationalism in both countries. Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso declared China a threat recently, but alas this is also nothing new.

The latest round of bickering was brought about by the suicide of staffer at the Japanese consulate in Shanghai. According to a spokesman for the Japanese Foreign Ministry, "an impermissible act by the Chinese security authorities" was the catalyst for the suicide. Japanese media has filled in the details that the spokesman left out. From the Yomiuri Shimbun:

A Chinese man who approached a staff member at the Japanese Consulate General in Shanghai who later committed suicide was apparently an intelligence operative and demanded the staffer supply secret information, including Japan's policy on the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands, according to sources...

The man told the staffer [a Chinese female "acquaintance"] had broken the law and would be punished. He also told the staffer that he faced punishment or forced repatriation as her accomplice. He then asked the staffer about the Japanese government's policy on the disputed island and said that both of the woman and the staffer would be punished if he refused to provide the information.

There is speculation that the details of the case were intentionally leaked by the Foreign Ministry and and even granted them to publish the information.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has replied with "strong indignation" over the "vile behavior" of the Japanese government. According to Qin Gang, spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the allegations are due to "ulterior motives" namely smearing China's international reputation.

Update: The Horse's Mouth has a post on Japanese feelings toward China reaching a low point.

[China] [Japan]

Democracy as Defense

2005-12-28T21:01:00.000-05:00

I blogged previously on Taiwan's Silicon Shield. Michael Turton proposes that Taiwan is defended by its democracy. Whatever one's opinion of Taiwan's self-defense capaabilities, it appears that Taiwan is effectively using consonance to its advantage.

[N]ot only does every democratic election establish Taiwan as an independent state, but the deeper democracy entrenches, the thornier the problem it presents for the occupation planning.

Asiapundit concurs and adds:

Taiwan's rambunctious democracy makes it unlikely that the island could be easily forced back into an authoritarian system. Plus, it strengthens the resolve of allies to come to its defense.

Update: Jujuflop and Peking Duck weigh in as well.

[Democracy] [Taiwan]

Stealing Credibility

2005-12-28T20:45:00.000-05:00

Danwei offers an article by Bruce Humes on using an edited copy of the New York Times as propaganda in China.

What's more convincing to the masses than propaganda out of Beijing? Discreetly massaged copy from the New York Times, evidently.

Humes tells how the "much-respected Chinese-language digest of the world press" Cankao Xiaoxi translates articles from the foreign media while removing "references deemed unbecoming to China's image."
Excerpt:

Unlike many other publications in China, Cankao Xiaoxi implements strict standards for translation: Virtually no English is used, no content is added, and politically incorrect terms--such as the Republic of China--are translated directly into the Chinese if they appear as such in the original. Such practices make for a good read and have endowed the brandname with an air of authoritativeness over the years.

[Censorship] [China]

Random Round-up

2005-12-22T11:36:00.000-05:00

In today's glance at my daily blogs (see blogroll at right), I found three good posts worthy of linking. Since I don't have much to add on any of the three, I'll just provide the links.

Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso is the second Japanese official in to call China a threat recently. (East Asia Watch, Breit Bart)

Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou was interviewed by Newsweek. The answers were perfect, but so were the questions--a little too perfect. (The View From Taiwan)

Korean sources bring us details about China's newest boomer--the Type 94--due to achieve initial operating capability in the next few months. (The Marmot's Hole)

Excerpt from the Ma interview:

ADAMS: The DPP lost a lot of ground to your party in the recent elections. Are you pleased?
MA: We did well, but not because the KMT has really improved itself. Rather, the DPP has become so corrupt, and so inept, that people have lost confidence in them.

ADAMS: Under your leadership, the KMT seems well positioned to reclaim the presidency in 2008. How would your party change Taiwan's relations with China?
MA: The DPP is somewhat handicapped by their ideology. They have to keep a distance from mainland China. They have been very timid, very conservative and very reserved in pushing ahead a productive policy toward the Chinese mainland. If the KMT is able to get back in power, we will open up direct flights with the mainland in two years. That's critical to Taiwan's economy.

Go read the View From Taiwan post for Michael Turton's insight.

Update: David of Jujuflop also posted on the Ma interview.

[China] [Japan] [Taiwan]

Approvals Abundant With Blues Absent

2005-12-21T17:43:00.000-05:00

William Lai, Chair of the Procedures Committee, surprised the Pan Blues by ending debate on the Arms Bill and numerous other contentious issues and voting to send the issues to the floor for a vote or to other committees (Taipei Times, Taiwan News, Jujuflop). The Blues had kept numerous bills bottled-up in that committee, preventing them from even having a simple up or down vote. The forty-second time that the issue was in front of the committee has proven to be different than the first 41.

How did the Greens pull off such a feat?

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) caucus whip William Lai, who chaired yesterday's meeting, began the sitting promptly at noon, when just five of the pan-blue camp's 19 committee members had shown up. The DPP had mobilized all of its committee members to be there, giving Lai the quorum he needed to proceed.

The Arms Bill wasn't all that got by the absent legislators:

In addition to the arms budget, the bills now on the legislative agenda include confirmation of President Chen Shui-bian's nominees for the Control Yuan, the president's state of the nation address -- expected to focus on the arms procurement package -- and different versions of a party assets bill intended to compel the KMT to return its stolen assets.

The Blues are predictably peeved by the move, calling it a "surprise attack" and a "Pan Green raid." The leadership of the Pan Blue Coalition promised that they would retaliate and the legislature would soon return to deadlock.

[Arms Bill] [Taiwan]

Big Enough to Know Better

2005-12-21T09:11:00.000-05:00

Fareed Zakaria, editor of Newsweek and author of The Future of Freedom, has written about China's new guess at the size of its GDP. (Hat Tip: Simon World) In his article entitled "Big Enough to Know Better" he comments on the implications of this revaluation:

China is now the world's fourth largest economy, bigger than Italy, France and Britain. If you want a glimpse into the not-so-distant future, note that China is growing more than four times as fast as the next two countries on the list (Germany and Japan) and more than twice as fast as No. 1, the United States.

Comparisons
While some, to include the Wall Street Journal (subscription required, excerpted here) would argue that China is ranked sixth in light of this new information (not fourth)*, a bigger cause for concern in Asia is its relation to Japan. From The Standard:

'By the end of next year, the Chinese economy will be half the Japanese economy,' said Ken Courtis, vice- chairman for Asia at Goldman Sachs Group. 'The whole balance of power in this region is shifting.'

Macroblog looks at the two economies and concludes that such a difference in growth rates (roughly 10% vs. 2%) is to be expected. The inevitability of such a shift won't make the geopolitics of the gradual regional power redistribution, should it occur, any easier.

Conclusions
Zakaria posits:

My guess is that China's problems will stem not from failure but success. China has grown for three decades at a pace no other country has ever sustained... Every time you see a gleaming new highway in China, remember that there were homes, shops and farms where it now runs. The government moved those people, gave them something equivalent (often an hour away) and kept building. Every time you see a new factory, remember that the community around it might have protested, but that rarely stopped construction. Every time you see a dam, remember that it displaced whole villages and towns. It is the very fact that local or political forces cannot stop development that explains China's supercharged growth.

He concludes:

Beijing knows that it needs to open up, not crack down. But can a Leninist system do that? Two weeks ago, in Dongzhou, local authorities responded to protests against a new power plant by reportedly shooting 20 or more people and then tried to cover up the incident in a manner that would have made Stalin or Mao proud. Beijing has somehow found a way to do centrally planned capitalism. But now it seems to be attempting something far more complex: centrally planned pluralism.

Simon World also makes an interesting conclusion:

Several elements of China's government spending are set for big rises, especially education, health and defence, as these are usually set as a percentage of GDP. However the question will be how the Government will pay for these increases - just because the statistics say there's a jump in GDP, it doesn't mean the money magically appears in the coffers.

Update: Survived SARS is optimistic that this change will make Chinese economic statistics more accurate from here on out. I would argue if you multiply made up figures by .17, the result is equally fictional.

* After further analysis it appears the 4th vs. 6th difference is based on whether or not 2005's estimated nine percent growth is figured in.

[China] [Economy]

Three Percent

2005-12-19T19:05:00.000-05:00

In the last few days there has been a lot of discussion of increasing defense spending and what appears to be movement toward a real debate on the weapons systems offered for sale to Taiwan by the United States, which includes the eight diesel submarines, Patriot missiles, and anti-submarine aircraft.

Saturday, President Chen Shui-bian announced that he intended to see defense spending increased to three percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) by the time he leaves office in 2008.* That same day, Tseng Yung-chuan, the KMT's Party Whip, indicated the KMT may allow debate of the arms purchases requested by the Ministry of Defense if the administration increases defense spending to three percent of GDP. It is unclear which of these statements was made first.

The Pan Blues have been working their hardest to stall any initiative put forth by the administration. The obstruction recently reached the point where the Pan Greens asked the Blues to state their real position on the arms procurement rather than creating excuses to snipe Green proposals. That brought about Mr. Tseng's reply above. Lest one become optimistic and think the impasse is history, Mr. Tseng elaborated on the offer, saying that the Patriot missiles were off the table because in his view, they had been voted down in the 2004 referendum. The Pan Greens will surely disagree with that interpretation of the referendum.

KMT Legislator Ting Shou-chung, a member of the KMT task force examining the arms procurement, further clarified:

All three of the major items must be carefully re-examined because the Patriot missile batteries have already been vetoed in the referendum, the submarines are way too expensive and the maritime patrol aircraft are definitely outdated.

If one thought the move to three percent might still hold the key to cooperation, KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou offered a new spin on why the Blues have been obstructing the arms procurement (one really starts to wonder if they have a reason after the numerous changing explanations). The arms must be shown to be appropriate for Taiwan's defense needs and not simply a "cash-for-friendship" purchase. Ma claims this has been the Blue's reason for obstruction all along. I have long worried that the rationale for the purchase offered by Lee Teng-hui and others would come back to bite them and it appears to have done so.

*The ROC currently spends 2.4 percent of its GDP on defense. In comparison, the United States spends roughly 4 percent, when the appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan are included, and China spends as much as 4.3 percent depending on what is included and how it is calculated.

Updates:

See Michael Turton's reply and David's comment.

Sun Bin criticizes the CIA statistic on Chinese defense spending cited above and is criticized in return by Dylan in the comments. The discussion is certainly worth a read.

[Def Spending] [Taiwan]

They Just Don't Get It

2005-12-16T10:44:00.000-05:00

A pair of articles from Simon World's latest roundup discuss the inability of the Western media to understand China. Despite their similar goals, the articles are completely different. From The American Thinker comes China's Exports in Perspective, which argues that a misunderstanding of multinational corporations results in the media overstating China's economic clout. Howard French brings us an article from the People's Daily Online entitled "Western media's misreading of China 2005." As it is from the People's Daily, you should already know the theme.

First, the American Thinker post:

This [International Herald Tribune article] creates the false impression that many Chinese firms like Lenovo are gaining ground on their American rivals in areas involving the most advanced technology. In this story, Mr. Lague overlooks some critical points:

First, the main reason China has increased its high-tech exports in recent years is that more American companies like Dell are setting up shop in China and exporting finished products to the U.S. In fact, around 60% of China's total exports come from the final assembly factories of foreign-invested firms.

More importantly, much of the critical technology, which creates most of the product's value, is still imported from subsidiaries in developed countries (like Japan and Singapore).

More humorous is the People's Daily article:

We know that the world's misreading of China is not limited to 12 things. To eliminate these misunderstandings the maxim by Alghieri Dante "Follow your own course, and let people talk" is of no help here. We must meet the world's suspicions or even hostility with a more open attitude. We cannot extinguish rumors, but we believe that "rumors are stopped by the wise" and China will make more people wise with its own magnanimity.

It appears that the article will then pick 12 'misreadings' and show them to be wrong. Here is one on the topic of China's growing military strength, the article offers this misreading for debunking:

The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005 released by the US Department of Defense says, "China has a long-term ambition to extend its military clout to whole continental Asia. In the future, China's leaders may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests, or resolve disputes."

And now for an intellectual deconstruction of the argument, which will in turn facilitate its destruction:

Is that really so?

Even more humorous is the People's Daily's take on China's relationship with Zimbabwe. Myth:

"Zimbabwe has belonged to China."

Rebuttal:

When westerners speak of Zimbabwe they do so with some tone of jealousy. In contrast to the deteriorating relationship between western countries and Zimbabwe, China has kept traditional friendly relations with African countries including Zimbabwe.

Ah, now I see the light. I need to read the People's Daily more often. Then and only then will I truly understand international relations.

[China] [People's Daily] [Zimbabwe]

China's Colorless Foreign Policy

2005-12-16T10:18:00.000-05:00

China has a colorless foreign policy and Belarus finds that appealing, according to this post from Musing Under the Tenement Palm.

China's "We Don't Butt-In Like That Other Country" policy has earned it another great partner: Belarus. A big reason appears to be a mutual hatred of "Color Revolutions."

The post by HK Dave elucidates the shared interests of these two nations.

One attitude that China and Belarus share, as do many others in the region, is a distaste for the "color revolutions." According to the San Francisco Chronicle, "Newspaper kiosks sell the Soviet Belarus and Respublika newspapers, which these days are dominated by two topics: the continuing wheat harvest and the alleged Western conspiracy to overthrow the 50-year-old Lukashenko. "You will not succeed with the color revolution" -- a reference to Ukraine's Orange Revolution of 2004 -- "nor with the revision of state borders," the Respublika warned the regime's opponents in an editorial this month." China certainly shares some of these fears, as mentioned here before in Soros, Serbia and Chinese Censorship. A recent Foreign Policy magazine article titled China's Color-Coded Crackdown this October begins "In China's halls of power, the fall of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes has raised the uncomfortable specter of a Chinese popular uprising. According to the Hong Kong-based Open magazine, a report by Chinese President Hu Jintao, titled Fighting the People's War Without Gunsmoke, is guiding the Chinese Communist Party's "counterrevolution" offensive. The report, disseminated inside the party, outlines a series of measures aimed at nipping a potential Chinese "color revolution" in the bud." And in both countries (as well as Russia) it is believed that two Georges are behind this: Bush and Soros.

[Belarus] [China]

Dongzhou Situation

2005-12-11T21:41:00.000-05:00

For those trying to keep up with the situation in Dongzhou a few days back, here is a roundup of roundups.

Pajamas Media's "Trouble in Worker's Paradise"
Gateway Pundit's "Images of Tiananmen"
ESWN's roundup of articles in the mainstream media
Pajama Media's "The aftermathof the Dongzhou shooting"

Additionally, Peking Duck has a series of posts on the subject (1, 2, 3, 4, 5).

An excerpt from the Pajamas Media post:

Allegations continued that Chinese authorities were attempting to cover up a massacre of demonstrators in South China by buying the bodies, Associated Press reported, while the government insisted only a handful had perished and The Epoch Times released audiotape of villagers stating that 70 are dead... The Canadian Press is reporting that officials in China attempted to blame "a few instigators" who they claim attacked a power plant on Tuesday with "knives, steel spears, sticks, dynamite" and other alleged devices. Daimnation! has the story of the village being "completely sealed off."

Update: The official version of events is out.

[China] [Dongzhou]

Snow on Yuan

2005-12-07T22:53:00.000-05:00

American Treasury Secretary John Snow commented recently that the so-called float that replaced China's peg to the US dollar "has operated with too much rigidity." Some might view that as a reversal of policy considering the Treasury Department chose not to label China as a currency manipulator. Such an interpretation would be inaccurate. Survived SARS has the explanation.

Excerpt:

Some commentators may make the argument that these remarks are responses to the fairly extensive criticism Snow received from the recent Treasury report, but I think it's roughly in line with what he's been saying all along. The message doesn't seem to be changing, but the reporting does, largely because of the context and the expectations of each news cycle.

[China] [Currency]

Taiwan's Three-in-One Elections

2005-12-06T08:42:00.000-05:00

Taiwan recently conpleted its "three-in-one" local elections. The KMT won big, as was widely predicted. For the Western media this was obviously the people of Taiwan embracing China because the only thing that they know about the KMT is that it is the opposition party and it likes China more than President Chen Shui-bian, of the DPP.

Michael Turton, who makes a hobby out of highlighting and correcting the ignorance of the Western media on all things related to Taiwan, has a more realistic appraisal of the elections, what they mean, and what they don't mean.

Excerpt:

It is easy to identify factors such as the DPP's poor overall localization strategies, the KMT's long establishment at the local level, or the greater financial advantages of the former ruling party, but it is much harder to see what is missing. And here's something that wasn't there: China. Not a peep was heard out of China this election.

Another interesting fact noted by Michael (and few others) is that the DPP's percentage of the total vote has consistantly increased in the last few local elections. Could this have been a DPP success after all? Read the rest of the article and find out.

Additionally, check out Jujuflop's pieces on monitors/students of the election and how this election is really about setting the scene for 2008.

[Taiwan Election]

Firewall Activity

2005-12-05T09:46:00.000-05:00

The net nannies that run the Great Firewall of China have been busy. According to Matthew Stinson, Blogspot is once again blocked meaning that this blog and others will only get Chinese visitors that use proxies or surf via Google's cache.

In order to assure continued access to the Chinese market, some blogger services impose content requirements upon their users. Bingfeng's Teahouse seems to be hosted on such a server. His attempts to post on the recent elections in Taiwan were unsuccessful until he engaged in some impressive circumlocution (Taiwan becomes "the Chinese island located near Fujian province" and election becomes "activity"). As is the habit here at MeiZhongTai, messages that are censored get republished.

Basically my post says that Chinese people are happy with the results [of Taiwan's election], and the blue organization that won the activity will probably promote the relationship between that island and the rest of China, and the green organization that lost the activity, unlike many people think, might take a more provoking stance towards mainland China.

Bingfeng gets so tired of being told that Taiwan and election are "illicit words" that he actually uses an illicit word or two. If that offends you, don't read the post here.

[Censorship] [China]

Chinese Economic Pessimism

2005-12-04T15:18:00.000-05:00

Recently there have been a few articles predicting that a downturn in the Chinese economy is in the making. The best of the genre is below.

Newsweek has an article entitled "Second Thoughts," which argues that China's rate of growth is too high, leading businesses to look elsewhere. Overproduction is (Hat Tip: Peking Duck)
Runaway fixed-asset investment—the construction of unneeded factories, office towers and resorts—combined with sluggish consumer demand, has knocked the Middle Kingdom's macroeconomy severely out of whack. China's GDP is still expected to grow by 9.4 percent this year—but some economists believe serious problems are lurking behind that robust number. They argue that exports and excessive investment cannot continue to drive growth, because both have already reached unsustainable levels.
Stephen Roach of Morgan-Stanley argues in "China Slowdown" that his earlier predictions of an imminent slowdown in the Chinese economy were early, not wrong.
(Hat Tip: AsiaPundit)
In my view, the die is now cast for a significant slowing of Chinese GDP growth in 2006. At work is likely to be a downturn in China’s all-powerful investment cycle, driven by an important and surprising contraction in bank lending... The consensus view in the markets is that China will sustain its investment boom through the 2008 Beijing Olympics -- that it will simply not accept the potential embarrassment of a growth slowdown until after that momentous event is over.

Keep predicting a downturn and one day you'll be right.

[China] [Economy]

The Politics of Inalienability

2005-11-30T14:22:00.000-05:00

Dr. Mark Harrison shares his conference paper on "The Politics of Inalienability," which breaks down the notion that Taiwan is part of China into component parts and examines them individually.

Excerpt:

The Chinese claim over Taiwan is a complex issue, but two aspects may be distinguished. Firstly, is the claim by the government of the People's Republic of China for sovereignty over the island of Taiwan as national policy. Secondly is the ideology, widely-held in the PRC that Taiwan is a part of China. The second informs the first, and the two are entirely conflated in practice. However, the two are conceptually distinct: Government policy on China’s territorial claim is a set of codified, although changeable conditions of government action, whereas the idea that Taiwan is part of China is an ideology maintained socially as well as politically and with which the government must contend, manipulate and manage in its interests.

Hat Tip: Simon World

[China] [Taiwan]

China Not a Currency Manipulator

2005-11-29T09:57:00.000-05:00

Logan Wright at Survived SARS posts on the decision by the Bush administration to not label China a currency manipulator and its effect on the tariff proposed by some in Congress. Logan rightly sees this as a "victory for free trade." Give it a read.
Excerpt:

This move signals a much more assertive posture by the administration, who up until this point have been content to let Congress take the lead in public against the Chinese on this issue. However, a couple of Snow speeches before small audiences in Washington have signaled his clear opposition to the Schumer-Graham legislation that would impose a 27.5% tariff on all Chinese goods. By the way, have Schumer and Graham updated the bill to now propose a 25.3% tariff, taking the yuan's recent appreciation into account? Just wondering.

[China] [Currency]

China in Latin America

2005-11-27T10:37:00.000-05:00

By Dawn's Early Light has been blogging quite a bit lately on China's growing economic and political involvement in Latin America. Is China planning on building a military base in Panama? Is China moving into position to take over the Panama Canal as Bill Gertz insinuated in his book China Threat? Is China just trying to buy off Taiwan's remaining allies in Latin America? Read this most recent post and decide on your own.

Excerpt:

The Chinese, to grow their economy, require more natural resources than China has domestically. Securing metals and especially oil is vital to the long-term growth and modernization of the Chinese economy. China is seeking to obtain these supplies by increasing its good will with Latin American governments that have these resources, while minimizing Taiwan. Long-term Chinese goals will be to increase military contacts with these same nations to ultimately secure their economic interests.

[China] [Panama]

Economic Integration

2005-11-26T11:13:00.000-05:00

Michael Turton of The View from Taiwan has an interesting, in-depth analysis of the close economic ties between China and Taiwan. The most informative part of his analysis is his take on the resulting political effects, or lack thereof.

Yet another way to get a handle on the integration issue is to look at other pairs of nations with a long history of interrelating and shared culture. Take Germany and Austria. Ireland and the UK. The US and Canada. The US and UK. Australia and New Zealand. Ukraine and Russia. Taiwan and Japan. All these represent nations with shared cultures and languages, close trading relationships, colonial histories, and so on. Some of them are far more economically interdependent than China and Taiwan. Yet no one ever argues that New Zealand and Australia or Germany and Austria will become one state because they are so economically and culturally interdependent.

Update:The Madman of Chu responds here.

[China] [Taiwan]

PLAAF Flight Hours

2005-11-24T14:16:00.000-05:00

I previously rounded up some information on the annual number of hours flown by pilots in the PLAAF, the traditional measure of a pilot's proficiency. My comments have apparently expired (thanks Haloscan). I have therefore rounded up the data again.

This RAND report (PDF) compares the PLAAF to the ROCAF:
ROCAF pilots get significantly more flying time each year than do PLAAF airmen. The training standard for Taiwanese fighter pilots is between 150 and 180 hours per year, while PLAAF pilots may as little as 80 hours in the air each year. [36]

The footnotes offer additional information:
Published sources such as The Military Balance credit the ROCAF with 180 hours per year and the PLAAF with 80–110 depending on the type of aircraft. ROCAF personnel we talked with told us that their training levels were around 150 hours per year, while the PLAAF’s are often closer to 40–60 hours.

The source also points out that ROCAF flight training is qualitatively better as well (37).

The Jamestown Foundation says PLAAF's non-Sukhoi fighter pilots average 115-125 hours per annum.

Bernard Cole's Great Wall at Sea estimates PLAAF pilots get no more than 120 hours (124).

David Shambaugh's Modernizing China's Military explains the PLAAF keeps flight hours low to minimize accidents (as backward as the idea may be) and because pilots are given minimal amounts of fuel to prevent defections (98).

[Air Force] [China] [Taiwan]

PLAN Troop Transport

2005-11-24T02:04:00.000-05:00

In the comments of an earlier post, reader Dylan questioned my assertion that the PLAN could transport only one division to Taiwan.

How old are your estimates of PLA power projection capabilities? In the last two years PLAN has doubled its amphibious lift. PLAAF will double its airlift next year with new Il-76s. In addition, PLA has been doing far more serious and disciplined work on taking up ships and aircraft from trade for lift capacity enhancement. The "million man swin" is exactly as you described it - a concept of the past not the present or near future.

I like to answer one assertion at a time and thus will save the growing PLA Air Force (PLAAF) for another post and focus on the rapidly increasing ability of the PLA Navy (PLAN) to project forces to Taiwan.

I commented that the PLAN only had the capability to transport one division (10-15,000 troops with gear) across the Taiwan Strait. This has long been conventional wisdom in the PLA-watching community, but Dylan is wise to challenge such conventional wisdom in light of the fast-paced growth of the People's Liberation Army, especially the Navy component thereof.

China Commission Report
The most recent, although not necessarily the most authoritative, source on the subject is the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which, in its 2005 report, stated:

[D]uring the period 2001 through 2005, China built 23 new amphibious assault ships capable of ferrying tanks, armored vehicles, and troops across the 100-mile-wide strait to Taiwan. Nearly all the PLAN’s inventory of U.S.-built, World War II-vintage landing ships has been replaced by similar numbers of domestically-produced vessels. These new, larger, and more specialized vessels, combined with the new Dayun-class supply ships, will form the basis of a more modern and expanded amphibious fleet. [PDF, 123]

The Commission cited as its source this GlobalSecurity.org article, but the report never offers an estimate for the number of troops the PLAN can transport and thus we must look to the article. The article offers additional information. Here is the entire paragraph to offer context:

During the period 2001 through 2005, China moved ahead with one of the most ambitious military buildups in the world - including building 23 new amphibious assault ships that could ferry tanks, armored vehicles and troops across the 100 miles to Taiwan. Nearly all of the PLAN's inventory of US-built, World War II-vintage landing ships have been replaced by similar numbers of domestically-produced vessels. These new, larger, and more specialized vessels, combined with the new Dayun-class supply ships, will form the basis of a more modern and expanded fleet. Shortcomings in long-range lift, logistics, and air support, however, hinders China's ability to project amphibious forces.

At this point, you have probably noticed two things:

The report plagiarized the Global Security article wholesale.

They deleted the last sentence of the paragraph, thus offering information about the rapid build-up but not a comprehensive assessment of the PLAN's ability to invade Taiwan. Wouldn't want any objectivity getting in the way, I guess.

The article continues:

The PLAN's amphibious fleet provides sealift sufficient to transport approximately one infantry division, although it has yet to conduct training exercises on this scale. The PLAN also has hundreds of smaller landing craft, barges, and troop transports, all of which could be used together with fishing boats, trawlers, and civilian merchant ships to augment the naval amphibious fleet. While in principle large numbers of troops could be transported by such expedient means, in practice such a "human wave" assault would be a high-risk undertaking, particularly in the absence of rehearsed air and sea cover. [emphasis added]

I have already addressed the notion that the PLAN can utilize fishing boats to augment its invasion force to any significant degree here and thus will spare you a recap.

Pentagon Report
If an August article from Global Security isn't credible enough, or you just wanted a second opinion, fear not. Last July, the Pentagon released its annual report "The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China," which I analyzed in detail here. That report attributes to the PLAN "40 medium and heavy amphibious lift vessels" in the text of the report and further clarifies in the appendix that China has 20 tank landing ships and 23 medium landing ships (PDF, 4, 44). It never uses the ship count to quantify the PLAN's troop transport capability, a deficiency for which I criticized the report at the time of its publication.

There are numerous other defense publications that estimate the PLAN's ability to transport ground forces to Taiwan, but none of them that I am familiar with are recent enough to be helpful if PLAN troop transport capabilities are advancing as quickly as some people believe. Anyone who has additional 2005 sources, please post a link in the comments.

[China] [Navy] [Taiwan]

Taiwan Doesn't Need the Subs

2005-11-23T12:32:00.000-05:00

I have been the leading proponent of Taiwan purchasing the eight diesel submarines offered them by the United States in recent months. No more! MeiZhongTai is officially changing sides in this debate.

Debates on Taiwan's special budget have been going on for months between Michael Turton, Sun Bin, and myself. The most controversial piece of the arms package has proven to be the eight diesel submarines at a cost of 657 million USD each (2.5 times the regular cost of a comparable diesel submarine).

In the past, I reasoned that Taiwan, an island nation, cannot risk ceding the subsurface to a potential invading/blockading force (the PLAN) and thus must be willing to pay any cost to acquire a force that can contest submarine control, even if it would lose in a drawn-out contest. An 8:50 ratio in submarines would force China to fight for dominance, while a 2:50 ratio would amount to surrender (especially considering the identity of Taiwan's two seaworthy submarines at present). Tis better to have fought and lost than never to have fought at all, I reasoned.

After considering the arguments of my fellow China/Taiwan bloggers and discussing the matter further with a professor of mine, I have concluded that I was approaching the issue all wrong. The logic that I was missing is embarassingly simple. If China has to battle Taiwan's submarines for control of the subsurface, it won't dispatch its entire submarine force to do so. China would, at most, send two of its attack subs in search of every Taiwanese sub. Were Taiwan to acquire the eight new submarines, that would distract, at most 16 PLAN submarines in a Taiwan Strait conflict. That would leave China 39 attack submarines to sink the ROCN surface fleet or Taiwan's merchant marines, or protect its own invasion force. Additionally, any ROC submarine that successfully carries out an attack on PLAN forces would be immediately sunk by PLAN submarines, destroyers, or sub-hunting aircraft.

In such a scenario, the cost-benefit analysis becomes a simple one of comparing the cost of an ROC submarine to the cost that China would incur for adding two additional attack submarines to its fleet. Obviously, China's growing defense budget can more easily foot the bill for two domestically produced subs than can Taiwan's shrinking defense spending afford to buy subs at such an inflated price.

Thank you to Sun Bin, Michael Turton, and those with whom I discussed this issue in person for showing me the light. This is exactly why I blog... to force me to defend my assertions and reevaluate them in the face of additional (and possibly conflicting) information.

[China] [Taiwan]

Vatican Two Step

2005-11-23T12:22:00.000-05:00

Taiwan is playing host to a senior envoy from the Vatican amid speculation that the Holy See is planning to switch diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic. Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran is giving hints that the Vatican may attempt to open diplomatic relations with China while maintaining official relations with Taiwan, something no country has yet been able to accomplish.

From the Taipei Times:

A senior Vatican official, whose visit to Taiwan prompted speculation that the Holy See may soon break ties with the nation, said yesterday that the Vatican would not abandon Taiwan even if it opens an embassy in China. Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, a former Vatican foreign minister, said the Holy See would find an 'appropriate way' to maintain ties with Taiwan. 'When religious freedom is realized in China, then the Holy See is ready to change the nature of relations with Taiwan,' Tauran said in a speech in Taipei. 'If and when the normalization [of relations with China] happens, the Holy See will not abandon Taiwan,' said Tauran, who is scheduled to meet President Chen Shui-bian during his week-long stay. He did not elaborate, but added that the Holy See never took the initiative to break diplomatic relations with its allies.

Update: Is Taiwan's MOFA trying to convince the Vatican to go?

[China] [Taiwan] [Vatican]

ROCA Force Quality

2005-11-22T21:53:00.000-05:00

Here is a paper I wrote for one of my classes (hence the different format). What do you think?

SUMMARY: Taiwan Army's technological advantage has eroded, but its personnel advantage remains. China’s ability to project power, and thus achieve local preponderance, has improved but remains insufficient. Taiwan should take measures to maximize its personnel advantage while working to achieve technological parity. END SUMMARY

Taiwan is constantly under threat of attack by the People's Republic of China (PRC) but has not seen sustained combat in over a half century. In the absence of combat, the best measures the potency of Taiwan's army are its ability to achieve a preponderance of force relative to an invading force, the technological sophistication of its advanced weapons systems--particularly armor, and force quality. Its military effectiveness will be considered relative to the forces of an invading People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Naval and air forces will not be evaluated with the exception of China's ability to use its naval and air forces to project ground forces, which is central to evaluating the PLA's ability to achieve a favorable local force ratio.

Preponderance
The PLA has 1.6 million soldiers on active duty, eight-times the number of Taiwan (The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005, 43). The PRC is unlikely, however, to be able to turn that overall advantage into a favorable local force ratio in an invasion of Taiwan. Michael O'Hanlon, who has conducted the most extensive unclassified analysis of the subject to date, has concluded that China would be unable to establish a beachhead on Taiwan ("Why China Can't Conquer Taiwan," 68-69). His estimates are somewhat dated, but his estimate that China would be able to project no more than 15,000 men (with equipment) by sea and 6,000 by air provide a good starting point for analysis (Ibid, 62). Even minimal advance notice of attack would allow Taiwan to station its forces at the relatively few areas of its western shore where China could land forces, guaranteeing Taiwan local force ratios in its favor. Additionally, even if the PLA somehow proved able to gain a foothold in Taiwan, Taiwan’s army could be reinforced at least five times as fast as the PLA (Ibid, 68-9). Therefore, due to proximity of reinforcements to the conflict, Taiwan can expect to have numerical preponderance in any conflict on the island.

Armor Forces
As discussed above, China is unlikely to get a sizable force ashore. Were it to do so, however, PLA forces would try to expand their area of control as quickly as possible and attempt to break out of Taiwan’s containment. Tanks would be vital to exploiting any hole that the PLA forces were able to open up in Taiwan’s defenses and therefore a comparison of the armored forces of the two nations is relevant.

Taiwan’s best tank is the M60A3 Patton main battle tank, which is comparable to the Russian-made T-72. Estimates as to the number of M60A3s in service in Taiwan’s Army vary (A,B) but average to approximately 430. Taiwan also has approximately 550 M48 Pattons and variants (specifically the CM11 and CM12) and 675 M-41 and M-41D Walker Bulldogs, which are being phased out of service.

The PLA would employ its Type 99 amphibious tank in an invasion, which is a seriously modified Type 63 tank that is sometimes designated the Type 63A-1. Due to confusion with the designations, the total number of this particular model are unknown but China’s limited number of tank landing ships (20) makes the total number of Type 99s irrelevant (Military Power, 43).

In a head-to-head tank battle, the lighter, faster, and more powerful Type 99 would have the advantage over the much older Patton. Without information about the location of the Chinese invasion, any estimate of what local armor ratio could be expected would be unreliable. Due to the warning time that Taiwan would have in any invasion and the size of the island, Taiwan could expect to have a large enough numerical advantage to negate any technological advances possessed by the Type 99.

Force Quality
The Taiwan Army has numerous force quality deficiencies. Most important is the lack of initiative on the part of its tactical leadership. Company-grade officers and below are given little or no opportunity to make leadership decisions unsupervised. The failure of more senior officers to delegate meaningful tasks to subordinates results in lieutenants and captains spending their days on tasks that should be accomplished by enlisted personnel. Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are often treated like children and assumed by officers to be incapable of even the most basic of tasks without supervision. The paucity of tactical leadership, combined with the scripted nature of military exercises, casts serious doubt on Taiwan’s ability to carry out the modern system of force employment.

The second largest problem plaguing Taiwan's army is poor morale as a result of being a conscription-based force. This problem is complicated by the low regard that Taiwan's citizens hold for army officers and men. Many conscript soldiers predictably view military service as a nuisance to be completed with as little effort as possible. A general conception that Taiwan has no hope of success in a war with China also undermines any esprit de corps that develops. Additional concerns are poor maintenance, a failure to integrate warning systems into the core military communication system, and stovepiping in both training and acquisition.

China’s military exhibits all of the aforementioned deficiencies and more. Michael O’Hanlon summarizes the quality of the men of the PLA as follows:

Although Chinese military personnel are generally competent at basic infantry skills, the armed forces do not tend to attract China's best, nepotism is prevalent, party loyalty is of paramount importance, most soldiers are semiliterate peasants serving short tours of duty, and a strong professional noncommissioned officer corps is lacking. [62]

The primary difference between the two forces is the quality of training. The training of the Chinese military has been described as ranging "from spotty to poor." Taiwan’s forces, on the other hand, train to Western standards under a cadre of American educated and trained officers and NCOs. They are generally considered to be proficient at the application of military force with the exceptions noted above.

Conclusion
In an invasion of Taiwan by the People's Liberation Army, Taiwan can expect to have theater and local numerical superiority in both infantry and armor. Taiwan’s advantages in numbers and training will likely compensate for any pockets of excellence enjoyed by the Chinese, such as deadlier tanks. Taiwan could expect to extract a heavy cost from an invading Chinese army and emerge victorious.

Recommended Course of Action
Taiwan should address its deficiencies in force quality to maximize its advantage in this area. Taiwan's egalitarian and democratic government give it a comparative advantage in force quality that, to date, it has not sought to maximize. Specifically, Taiwan should take steps to empower its junior officers and maximize the influence of its NCOs through changes in training and task delegation. China's autocratic regime makes it much harder for the Communist leadership to entrust its tactical leadership with equivalent duties. This course of action will provide the ROC Army with the increased flexibility that delegation of decisions offers and generally maximize the utilization of its human capital. This modernization can be enacted by changes in education and Army culture with little or no financial cost to the army.*

Additionally, Taiwan should continue to modernize its weapon systems, including its armor forces, as funding is available. There is no reason to cede the technological advantage to China when the distances involved should provide Taiwan with the advantage in heavy forces. Increased focus on anti-tank weapons or more advanced tanks would help address this weakness at minimal cost.

Taiwan’s preponderance of forces is deemed sufficient. No increase is recommended, although drilling must be conducted regularly to ensure the ability to rapidly mobilize and deploy reserve forces.

*Army culture is often characterized as resistant to change. In fact, it proves to be extremely malleable when rules and customs for promotion are altered. When an officer’s delegation of tasks and the capabilities of his subordinates become part of fitness reports for promotion, the culture will follow.

[China] [Taiwan]

Writing Up a Storm

2005-11-22T10:21:00.000-05:00

Angry Chinese Blogger posts on a book entitled "An Introduction to China," which was written by a Taiwanese author and paints a vile picture of China.

Taiwanese nationalists have been actively seeking to raise nationalist feelings in Japan and to increase support for Japan's discredited nationalist minority, based on the principle that, the more Japan turns to nationalism the more it will turn against Mainland China, and the more that it turns against Mainland China, the easier it will be for them to recruit Tokyo as an ally in Taipei's cold war against Beijing.

How bad of a picture of China, you might ask.

Throughout its pages, "An Introduction" variously describes China as being a nation whose economy is fueled by prostitution and whose people are fixated with cannibalism and the fabrication of their own history. It plays down Japanese war crimes against China, and even goes so far as to suggest that Japan was the victim of Chinese aggression during the Sino-Japanese war, rather than the other way round.

I'm not a big fan of ACB's use of "Chinese Taiwan" throughout the post (That is even worse than "Chinese Taipei"), but otherwise it is quite an interesting read.

[Japan] [Taiwan]

Cope India: Another Loss?

2005-11-21T21:16:00.000-05:00

Last year's Cope India exercise appeared to be a resounding defeat for the United States Air Force (USAF). It appears this year's exercises were a repeat of last year's. Newshog brings the news (Hat Tip: Michael Turton):

As the Cope India 2005 Indo-US air force exercises wound down today after two weeks of feverish action in the eastern skies, the US Air Force were left with a stark, double-edged realisation. One--that it is no longer the unchallenged leader in the skies, and two--for all future joint operations in South Asia, the IAF would, without doubt, be its natural partner.

While this seems a bit extreme (Newshog calls the report "even more jubilant"), it is nonetheless concerning. Since it is appearing in this forum, it is obvious that the implications for China (Can the PLAAF reasonably hope to defeat the USAF?) will be analyzed, rather than the implications for India (Why buy this plane if our current planes can beat it?).

Personally, I am still inclined to believe that the American pilots were holding back, as was widely believed to be the case in 2004, in order to justify acquiring the F/A-22 and F-35. On the other hand, I am increasingly eager for the United States to acquire those fifth-generation fighters. I guess that means the pilots have accomplished their goal.

Even if the American pilots genuinely were outclassed, I still sleep easy at night knowing that the Chinese pilots they might conceivably face aren't getting enough flight hours.

A blog named India Defense has another good article on the subject here.

Update: Dawn's Early Light has a good discussion of the 2004 exercise that explains why the US lost much clearer than I have found elsewhere. LGM also has a post on the subject.

[Cope India] [USAF]

Bush Visit

2005-11-21T11:05:00.000-05:00

Some pundits seem to be upset that President Bush hasn't done more to upset the Chinese. He gave his biggest pro-democracy speech in Japan. He gave his big anti-communism speech in Mongolia. Many think both speeches should have been given in China even at the risk (or due to the prospect) of riling the Chinese. Additionally, he attended a state-sanctioned church instead of a "house church." Two Republican Congressmen have a plan to cure all that.

From the Taipei Times:

Two pro-Taiwan members of the US House of Representatives proposed that President George W. Bush take advantage of his current trip to Asia to visit Taiwan as a token of US recognition of the island's outstanding achievements in promoting freedom and democracy. Representatives Tomas Tancredo and Robert Simmons, both Republicans, made the appeal in a joint letter dated Nov. 15 to Bush, who is attending the 2005 APEC informal leadership summit in Busan, South Korea.

That would surely rile up the Chinese. Why do such a thing now?

The congressmen said in the letter that if Bush were to make a brief visit to Taiwan following the summit, he would be able to meet with Taiwan's leader to lay an emphasis on the importance of arms procurement for the country's future, in addition to reaffirming US commitment to a free and democratic Taiwan.

That would send entirely the wrong sign to Taiwan. I have previously pointed out differences between the American and Taiwanese arguments for procuring this weapons system. Starting from the Taiwanese version, a trip to Taiwan would look like strong-arming the legislature into purchasing the weapons. It would also make President Bush look weak. When the strongest power in the world is begging you to buy arms, you might just try to see what you can get out of him in return. Do we really want to create a The Taiwan that Can Say No movement?

(For those not familiar with The Japan that Can Say No or the other similar texts, like The France That Can Say No, it represents the idea that the US is just as dependent on Japan as Japan is on America and thus Japan can ignore America's wishes.)

[Bush] [China] [Taiwan]

Power Politics: Tragedies and Transitions

2005-11-21T00:51:00.000-05:00

An article by John Mearsheimer has brough Logan Wright of Survived SARS out of his "blogging slumber." Mearsheimer writes bluntly:

THE question at hand is simple and profound: will China rise peacefully? My answer is no. If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the US and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war.

Mearsheimer is simply applying his Offensive Realist theory ("The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximise its share of world power and eventually dominate the system.") to a rising China, as Logan points out in greater detail. Mearsheimer's conclusion (China is rising and America doesn't want a peer competitor in Asia) isn't particularly novel. This has all been said before and seems to me to be entirely to simplistic to be interesting, much less enlightening.

Power Transition Theory
A much more interesting analysis, in my opinion, is that of Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tamen. Regional Challenges: China's Rise to Power (PDF) looks at China's rise through the eyes of Power Transition theory, which is explained in detail here.

Simply put, Realists tend to disagree as to whether the international system is most stable with one, two, or multiple powers. Power Transition theorists would argue the number is irrelevant. Wars result from shifts in the distribution of power. When the hierarchy of power in a region is challenged and the rising power is dissatisfied with the international system, war is likely to result.

Since most experts expect China to surpass the US economically near the middle of this century, the answer to Dr. Mearsheimer's question above can be found in to what degree China is satisfied with the current international system.

[China] [Realism]

China's Ballistic Missiles

2005-11-20T12:21:00.000-05:00

According to the 2005 report "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China":

China has deployed some 650-730 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to garrisons opposite Taiwan. Deployment of these systems is increasing at a rate of about 100 missiles per year. Newer versions of these missiles feature improved range and accuracy. [4]

These missiles often come up in conversations about China employing force upon Taiwan. It is worth taking the time to do the math and figure out what exactly 700 missiles (plus or minus) could accomplish.

Quantity of Missiles
China has about 700 SRBMs, but how many of those would actually be used? Strategist and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling points out the value of the threat of force relative to its employment:

To be coercive, violence has to be anticipated... It is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behavior, if the power to hurt can get it at all. [Arms and Influence, 2-3]

Thus it would appear that China would want to hold a substantial missile capability in reserve to maximize its influence. This is logical because, were China to shoot all of its missiles without Taiwan capitulating, it would have little remaining leverage (short of an invasion or blockade). While it is anyone's guess how many missiles China would calculate that it should hold in reserve, I've heard from a few different military types that one-third or more is the standard formula. If that is the case, that would mean that China could employ about 467 of its 700 and maintain a reserve of roughly 233.

Mechanical Malfunctions
Chinese SRBMs were designed to be improved SCUD missiles. Thus it would seem to be fair to use estimates for the probability of mechanical malfunction in flight used for the older Soviet tactical missiles. The probability of a missile surviving its flight (not accounting for missile defenses) ranges from 70% to 90% for such Soviet missiles. Assuming the Chinese missiles are on the more reliable end of the estimates, 10% (or 47 missiles) are still lost to mechanical malfunctions. That leaves 420 missiles headed for Taiwan.

Missile Defenses
Currently Taiwan's missile defenses are meager. Taiwan fields 200 Patriot-2 Plus (PAC-2 Plus) missiles for its three Patriot batteries. Were it to acquire the Patriot missiles under consideration for purchase from America, Taiwan's Patriot inventory would increase to almost 600 with the majority being Patriot-3s (PAC-3). Both generations of Patriots are untested under combat conditions and thus it is unclear how many incoming missiles Taiwan's missile batteries could be expected to destroy with or without the new PAC-3s. Estimates for the success of earlier generation of Patriots in the first Gulf War vary too much to be helpful.

I personally would guess that the Patriots would have a 50% kill rate, but to be honest I have no data to back that estimate up. Based on my estimates, Taiwan could kill 100 missiles before they reach their targets (with their current Patriot capabilities), bringing the number that would cause damage down to 320. If more Patriots are acquired the number reaching Taiwan would be further reduced.

One problem with this analysis is that China may have already found a way to improve their SRBM's survivability against Patriot missiles. (Hat Tip: Michael Turton)

Mr. [Richard] Fisher... believes the PLA used illicit Patriot data to improve M-9 [CSS-6] short-range missiles aimed at Taiwan, which China views as a breakaway republic and has vowed to reincorporate with the mainland -- by force if necessary. "They used the information from the Patriot for the M-9 to be able to evade Patriot interception," Mr. Fisher said. [source]

Accuracy
CSS-6s have a circular error probability (CEP) of 280 meters. CSS-7s have a CEP of 200 meters. With this accuracy, and assuming that the targets are not hardened and the target location is precisely known to the Chinese, China would have a 3% probability of destroying a building with a CSS-6 or a 6% probability of destruction with a CSS-7. With this limited degree of accuracy, it would take 44 CSS-6s or 23 CSS-7s to destroy a target with 75% certainty.* Thus, if China's missile batteries are composed equally of CSS-6s and CSS-7s, China could expect to destroy ten buildings with 75% certainty using all of its missiles (except the 233 it has held in reserve). If no missiles were held in reserve and thus 530 missiles reach their targets, 15 buildings could be destroyed with the same degree of certainty.

GPS Upgrades
The most recent models of both SRBMs may be equipped with global positioning system (GPS) guidance systems which improves their accuracy to a CEP of 30-45 meters. With such an accuracy, the missiles could be expected to achieve a one shot, one kill accuracy with 87% confidence. This would completely change the accuracy section of analysis above and allow China to be relatively confident of its ability to kill one target with each missile. With GPS upgrades, China could reasonably expect to destroy 240 targets with its 320 missiles that reach their targets or 461 targets if no missiles were held in reserve.

Targets
The above analysis assumes that China has a specific list of targets that it deems most important to destroying Taiwan's will to defend itself, such as the Presidential Palace, the Ministry of Defense building, command and control facilities, and Taipei 101. This may not, however, be the case.

That’s the lesson that Saddam taught us, that ballistic missiles may have little military value but do have great terror potential. [GEN Charles Horner]

If China were to target populated areas instead of specific targets, it would be able to create great destruction. No longer would China be launching 20 or more missiles at one target, and it could send all of its missiles toward Taiwan's residential and commercial areas with the greatest population density. This would be a direct attack on national will--as would any missile attack. China could not take any ground with missiles, only boots on the ground can do that, but China may hope to convince Taiwan to surrender because of the vast destruction and threat of more destruction (see the importance of reserves).

National Will
When attacking national will, missiles are no different than saturation bombing. The same munitions, delivered by different platforms (planes instead of missiles) were seen on both fronts in World War II and numerous times since. Bombing cities in order to sway the population was first tried in the Battle of Britain and served only to strengthen the resolve of the Brits to fight and win the war. It has never had the decisive negative effect on national will that the air forces of the world often attribute to it.

[I]n more than thirty major strategic air campaigns that have thus far been waged, air power has never driven the masses into the streets to demand anything. [Bombing to Win, 68]

Simply put, the combined warhead capacity of 467 CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBMs (1,100 pounds each) is the equivalent of only 9.5 Vietnam era B-52 sorties (54,000 pounds each). Even if all 700 SRBMs were used and all reached their targets, it would only equal 14 sorties. To look at it another way, the 700 SRBMs would only total 385 tons of high explosives, compared with the hundreds of thousands of tons dropped on Vietnam, for example.

Any prediction as to what level of bombing would cause Taiwan to surrender is nothing but a guess, but if Taiwan surrendered as a result of such a minimal attack, it would be "history's statistical outlier," as one of my professors characterized such unlikely events. Many nations, including the ROC during the shelling of Kinmen and Matsu Island, have survived much worse.

Other Options
Another strategic bombing possibility is that the missiles would be aimed at command and control (C2) installations or strategic resources such as oil reserves. The goal would be to undermine the country's ability to wage war and thus encourage capitulation. In either case, such missile strikes would only be decisive if combined with other military action. Degrading C2 would only be beneficial if coupled with an invasion and oil is easily replaced unless a blockade is put into place.

Further Reading: After a significant amount of research, I found this analysis (PDF) of India's Prithvi missile to be the best analysis of the potential effectiveness of a conventionally-armed missile. My calculations have focused on the destruction of soft targets or semi-hardened buildings. If anyone is interested in calculating the effect China's SRBMs would have on Taiwan's airfields, the math is explained therein.

*This analysis is based on numerous assumptions. For simplicity of analysis, I assume that the lethal radius of each missile is 60 meters, as would be the case with a high explosive warhead (the most logical for the destruction of buildings). Other warhead types (prefragmentation, incendiary, or cluster) would differ. Additionally, I assume that if the missile lands within the blast radius of the center of the building, the structure is destroyed. The totality of destruction will vary with the size and hardness of the building, but I find this to be a fair simplification.

Update: An article in the Christian Science Monitor also looks at China's missile capabilities and comes to the same conclusion.

Then there are those 600-800 Chinese missiles aimed at Taiwan from Fujian province in China. US commanders, Taiwanese politicians, and journalists often describe these missiles as if they are a decisive military threat. In fact, they are more likely symbolic. As a munitions expert told the Monitor, 700 missiles is "nothing. For a military attack that is supposed to incapacitate and paralyze a country, it is not impressive."

[China] [Military]

Taiwan's Representive at APEC

2005-11-19T11:15:00.000-05:00

The Asia-Pacific Ecconomic Cooperation (APEC) is one of the few international organizations in which Taiwan is allowed to participate. Because the forum consists of "member economies," not countries, China has no objection to Taiwan's participation as "Chinese Taipei." Hong Kong is also a member.*

The challenge for Taipei is choosing a representative. President Chen Shui-bian would never be allowed to attend as Taiwan's representative, for example. At this year's summit, Taipei was represented by Lin Hsin-yi, an economic advisor to President Chen. Chen had initially chosen Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, who was rejected by South Korea, the events host, at China's request.

During the 2001 APEC meeting in Shanghai, Lin was prevented from speaking multiple times by Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan. In Seoul this week, however, the Chinese representatives were much more polite. Chinese President Hu Jintao shook Lin's hand and introduced Lin to his wife as "Mr. Lin Hsin-yi from Taiwan."

Even more noteworthy is Lin's meeting with Japan. This is the first APEC meeting since the US and Japan released their common strategic objectives, which included

Encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.

That February pronouncement was the first time Japan has included Taiwan in its security objectives and Lin sought to maximize on that shift during his APEC visit. As the Taipei Times reported:

Sources said that Lin had a private meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi yesterday morning. Lin probed the possibility of Japan establishing a Taiwan Relations Act, similar to that of the US, in order to improve relations with Taipei.

While there are those in Japan agitating for such a security guarantee, I doubt it will amount to anything.

*Another organization that "Chinese Taipei" has been able to join is the World Trade Organization. Taipei entered as a "separate customs territory."

[APEC] [China] [Taiwan]

Economic Growth and Liberty

2005-11-18T10:59:00.000-05:00

After the conclusion of the APEC Summit in South Korea, President Bush will head to Beijing. During his visit to Japan earlier this week, Bush called on the Chinese regime to liberalize, claiming a link between economic growth and political and religious freedoms.

As the people of China grow in prosperity, their demands for political freedom will grow as well. President Hu has explained to me his vision of "peaceful development," and he wants his people to be more prosperous. I have pointed out that the people of China want more freedom to express themselves, to worship without state control, to print Bibles and other sacred texts without fear of punishment. The efforts of Chinese people to -- China's people to improve their society should be welcomed as part of China's development. By meeting the legitimate demands of its citizens for freedom and openness, China's leaders can help their country grow into a modern, prosperous, and confident nation.

Biography of an Idea
The notion that economic liberalization leads to political liberalization is not a new one. The Clinton administration argued back in 2000 for extending Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status to China on the grounds that:

including China in the world trading system would lead to development of a market economy and to political reform and a more open Chinese society. [iv (PDF)]

Robert Zoellick and others have argued the same. Last week, however, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, in its 2005 report, concluded that this has not been the case in China to date.

China's economy has been growing at 8-10% annually for over two decades and will continue to do so for the next fifteen years, according to China's director of statistics. A brief look at the blogosphere doesn't give any impression of liberalization politically. Simon blogs on Beijing's (unsuccessful) attempts to keep as much power as possible at the center. Martyn posts on Beijing's fear of a "Color Revolution," which is to say American export of freedom and democracy. The simple fact that Martyn has to spell freedom and democracy with the number zero replacing the letter o to get around the Great Firewall of China indicates to me the lack of liberalization on the government's part.

Caution
Chinese President Hu Jintao recently stated that the world need not fear a rising China. In his 2002 China visit, Bush commented:

China is on a rising path, and America welcomes the emergence of a strong and peaceful and prosperous China.

I would argue that a better statement would be that America welcomes the emergence of a strong and prosperous China, if that China is also free and peaceful. If not, America and others will remain cautious.

[China] [US FOR POL]

China Commission Report Analyzed

2005-11-15T21:10:00.000-05:00

I posted five days ago on the release by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission of its 2005 report to Congress. At that time, I was only able to offer a link to the analysis of another blogger as I had not yet had time to read the full report. I just completed the report and have some thoughts on their analysis and recommendations.

CNOOC's Unocal Bid: The China Commission recommended against allowing CNOOC to acquire Unocal. I posted on this issue here.

Mercantilist Oil Policy: The commission accuses China of "mercantilism" in its efforts to acquire fossil fuels:
China should be strongly encouraged to (1) abandon its policy of acquiring oil at the wellhead or field in a mercantilist fashion; (2) procure oil and gas according to international practices (i.e. purchasing it on the open international marketplace); and (3) cease providing assistance, arms, and proliferation-related technologies to problematic states in possible return for access to their energy resources [176]

The commission misreads the implications:
Every barrel of oil that China buys in America, whether it is in North America, Central America, or Latin America, essentially means one less barrel available for the U.S. market. [170]

While this is true, it is irrelevant whether that barrel is consumed by China or America, the laws of supply and demand still remains true.

Robert Zoellick has said of the matter:
Chinas economic growth is driving its thirst for energy. In response, China is acting as if it can somehow "lock up" energy supplies around the world. This is not a sensible path to achieving energy security. Moreover, a mercantilist strategy leads to partnerships with regimes that hurt Chinas reputation and lead others to question its intentions. In contrast, market strategies can lessen volatility, instability, and hoarding.

Zoellick's comments come much closer to the real problem, which is connected to oil only tangentially. It is explained by the commission as follows:
In part in order to obtain access to energy resources and raw materials, China utilized and expanded relationships with nations such as Iran, Sudan, and Zimbabwe that have earned international opprobrium for objectionable human rights, terrorism support, and other activities. In these interactions, China focused on its narrow interests while dismissing international concerns. [143-144]

Whether China spends this political capital to acquire a good deal on oil or not is irrelevant. The problem is the undesirable frienships and weapons sales, not the oil. The macroeconomic effects of China paying less than market price in currency (and probably above market price when the cost of its UNSC vote and other factors are considered) is negligible. China's deal with Sudan or Zimbabwe is similar to the American deal with Saudi Arabia. While both pay a price below market value, neither noticeably effects the market as a whole.

USG and Taiwan: The commission finds:
The U.S. government has not laid adequate groundwork to allow a rapid response to a provocation in the Taiwan Strait. Almost any possible scenario involving U.S. military support to Taiwan would require extensive political and military coordination with the Taiwan government and regional allies, but the foundations for such coordination have not been laid. [117]

In order to address that deficiency, the commission recommends:
[T]he arms sales package should remain on offer, and it further believes that Congress should take steps to facilitate strong working relationships through such measures as authorizing the exchange of general and flag officers, conducting interactive combat data exchange with Taiwan defense forces, providing increased opportunities for Taiwan officers to be trained in the United States, and establishing institutional relationships with the Legislative Yuan to improve the oversight of defense matters. [135]

I agree with the commission's conclusion and recommendation.

Six Party Talks: The commission stated:
The extent of Chinese cooperation in the Six-Party Talks to achieve a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons programs is a critical test of the U.S.-China relationship. [161]

While the commission is right about the amount of leverage China holds over North Korea (ie: 90 percent of North Korea's energy supplies come from China), the analysis of Angry Chinese Blogger tells us that this is unlikely to be fruitful.

Revaluing the Yuan:The New York Times weighed in on this issue with the following:
Last week, a bipartisan advisory group delivered a report to Congress that sharply criticized China's trade practices and endorsed imposing sanctions, including a tariff on imports, unless Beijing takes forceful steps to allow its currency to move in line with market forces[...] Certainly Mr. Bush should urge China to move toward a more market-based currency[...] But Mr. Bush must resist the advisory group's shortsighted calls to hit Beijing over the head with the blunt instrument of trade sanctions. Smacking China until it complies with us on trade is a short-range policy that doesn't take into account that it is now a political as well as an economic global power. There is more at stake in the world than how many made-in-China T-shirts are on sale at Wal-Mart.

While certainly more than T-shirts are at stake, the Times is correct. The value of the yuan has a significant impact on the US-China trade imbalance, but tariffs are not the answer. The clearest explanation of the inherent problem is given in Commissioner William Reinsch's dissenting opinion:
It is clear that the Commission majority has never met a sanction it didn’t like or didn’t want to impose on China. Despite overwhelming evidence that unilateral sanctions fail to achieve their objectives and at the same time impose significant costs on the sanctioning nation, the Commission continues to recommend their imposition or expansion. [218]

Defense: The commission's report gets most of its defense information from the Department of Defense's 2005 China Report. One noteworthy addition is a thought provoking quote from Representative Rob Simmons:
China is buying new submarines literally by the dozen. [123]

This is certainly true and should be worrying to those who don't wish to see a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Special Budget: The report states:
Regrettably, the KMT has blocked President Chen’s legislative efforts to pass a special budget for defense purchases in a purely partisan move to gridlock his government [130]

I am sure that Michael Turton will be as pleased, as I am, that someone in the American government finally understands the true nature of the KMT's opposition to the special budget--obstructionist, plain and simple. The report explains just how important signals such as these can be to the likelihood of war:
The government gridlock in Taiwan that has resulted from the political in-fighting over national security issues sends a signal of weakness to Beijing and endangers U.S. security interests in the Pacific. As Princeton political scientist Thomas Christensen pointed out, any weakening of the security relationship between Washington and Taipei diminishes the deterrence presented to Beijing, and this is true whether or not Beijing seeks to avoid a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. [133]

Media Control: The China Commission was founded by Congress to analyze the effects of extending PNTR to China. The Clinton administration claimed that free trade would result in an opening up and democratization of China. Due to this mandate, the commission also evaluates how trade with the United States affects the control of the government over information. The commission concluded that the government has as firm a grip over the spread of information as it has in the past. I agree completely. I have written numerous times about the Great Firewall of China and posted an advertisement on the bottom of my blog to the Reporters Without Borders report on control of the internet.

[China] [UNCC]

EU Arms Embargo

2005-11-13T18:12:00.000-05:00

The European Union (EU) placed an arms embargo on China sixteen years ago due to the Tiananmen Square Massacre. For some time now the lifting of that embargo has looked imminent as EU leaders have become increasingly concerned about missing out on selling arms to what is likely the world's fastest growing military.

Angela Merkel, leader of Germany's Christian Democrats and the Chancellor-elect, plans to reverse that tide. (Hat Tip: East Asia Watch) Unlike outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who co-led the effort to end the embargo with France, Merkel supports the continuation of the embargo.

The Pentagon's 2005 China Report "Implications of Lifting the EU Arms Embargo" section concludes that:

In the medium to long term, however, the acquisition of European defense technology would significantly improve PLA capabilities. [25]

What specifically is China seeking?

China is most likely interested in acquiring advanced space technology, radar systems, earlywarning aircraft, submarine technology, and advanced electronic components for precision-guided weapons systems. [25]

and

Ending the embargo could also remove implicit limits on Chinese military interaction with European militaries, giving China’s armed forces broad access to critical military "software" such as modern military management practices, operational doctrine and training, and logistics expertise. [24-25]

In addition to those obvious implications, the Pentagon found reason to be concerned about secondary effects:

Lifting the EU embargo would also lead to greater foreign competition to sell arms to the PLA, giving Beijing leverage over Russia, Israel, and other foreign suppliers to relax limits on military sales to China. [25]

For more on the embargo and its implementation, see this Taipei Times article.

Update: In my original post, I forgot to mention a key player in the move to remove the embargo: EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. He also has been working to end the ban.

[China] [EU] [Germany]

China Commission Report

2005-11-10T16:23:00.000-05:00

The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission yesterday submitted its annual report to Congress. Recent blogroll addition East Asia Watch has the synopsis.

The commission was created by Congress in order to:

monitor and investigate and report to Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Previous reports by the commission can be found here.

Update: I have analyzed the report in greater detail here.

[China] [US FOR POL]

China's Friends

2005-11-07T10:51:00.000-05:00

Angry Chinese Blogger has been keeping a close-eye on Chinese relations with North Korea. First ACB blogged "Blame the Dragon, Slay the Ogre" about the American effort to increase pressure on China to use its leverage with North Korea. The Scoop Jackson National Security and Freedom Act is an interesting and controversial concept which is not being discussed nearly enough, I feel.

ACB followed up with another look at Chinese-North Korean relations through Chinese eyes in "We will choose our friends as we see fit". China has a habit of associating itself with the nations the rest of the world wants to see shunned (North Korea, Sudan, Zimbabwe). This article gives insight as to China's feelings toward such relationships.

Excerpt from the latter article:

There is an old saying in Asia: Similarities call out to friends, and in few places is this more evident the relationship between North Korea and China., and if recent announcements and trends hold true, this relationship looks set to evolve, into something much more solid and much more sustainable, much to the distress of nationalist elements in Washington.

Since the end of the Korean War, China has acted to support its ideological partner in terms of military assistance, civilian aid, and political recognition, in what has largely been an ‘aid provider-aid receiver’ relationship that has seen China assisting North Korea for reasons of unity and political face. However, recent moves by Beijing now show clearly that China intends to expand this relationship to a new level, much to the chagrin America, which would see North Korea isolated from the world and resigned to the status of pariah state.

During a high level press briefing, welcoming Chinese president Hu Jintao return from a three day ‘good will’ visit to North Korea, Wang Jiarui, the head of the International affairs department of China’s ruling central committee that China announced that China was now moving steadily to expand its dealings with North Korea to cover a broad range of area, and indicating that that Beijing soon hoped to develop the uneven Sino-North Korean relationship into a full two way economic relationship that would bring the two countries closer together than ever.

(Note that my blog doesn't correctly display Chinese or Japanese characters and thus such characters have been editted out)

[China] [DPRK]

Spy Ring

2005-11-06T20:30:00.000-05:00

A spy ring has been uncovered in California that fed defense information to Chinese military intelligence. Initial reports indicate that information on the Aegis weapon system, Virginia class submarine, and American aircraft carriers may have been compromised. (Hat Tip: View From Taiwan)

One interesting, if exagerrated, quote from the article comes from an anonymous American government official:

The Chinese now know more about our military than we know about their entire country.

Updated: Bill Gertz has an update.

[China] [Espionage] [US FOR POL]

ROC Dragon Ladies

2005-11-02T18:52:00.000-05:00

EastSouthWestNorth has translated a history of the U-2 Dragon Lady in the service of the Republic of China, specifically the five members of the Black Cat Squadron that were shot down by Chinese surface-to-air missiles.

The Black Cat Squadron was a group of pilots from the Republic of China who had been trained by the Americans to fly the U-2 spy planes. The first operation was mounted on January 13, 1962. Flying at 75,000 feet with a range of 4,000 miles, the U-2 planes were beyond the reach from most conventional weapons and airplanes.

Meanwhile, the PLA had established the PLAAF 1st Surface-to-Air Guide Missile Battalion in October 6, 1958. Later on, the Beijing and Nanjing military districts also formed the 2nd and 3rd Battalions respectively. These battalions owned only five sets of SAM-2 guided missile launch platforms and a total of 62 guided missiles. In October 1959, the battalions were secretly deployed in the Beijing area during the 10th anniversary celebration of the founding of the People's Republic of China.

In October 7, 1959, the PLAAF was able to use 3 SAM-2 missiles, which have an accuracy rate of only 2%, to shoot down an American made RB-57D spy plane. This was how the U-2 came into the picture.

Go read the rest.

[China] [Taiwan]

JMSDF Admiral: PLAN Not Yet a Threat

2005-10-31T14:41:00.000-05:00

Retired Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) Admiral Sumihiko Kawamura, a career naval aviator and founder of the Kawamura Institute, has long lobbied for a Japanese defense guarantee for Taiwan (an aim which was achieved to a degree in February of this year).

ADM Kawamura was recently interviewed by Taipei Times about the PLA Navy.

Kawamura stated:

I see PLAN's capability as still being limited or weak in terms of the four major missions of a navy -- strategic deterrence, projection of power, sea control and sea-lane security.

He evaluated the PLAN's ability to conduct war against Taiwan as follows:

[I]f China invaded Taiwan, PLAN would not be able to sustain logistic support from China because it cannot control the waters between Taiwan and China. Finally, China also has a limited capability to conduct a blockade of sea lanes.

He concluded by discouraging Taiwan from buying the eight diesel submarines they have been offered by the United States--a position Michael Turton and Sun Bin would certainly appreciate. Go give it a read.

[China] [Japan] [Taiwan]

Kidds Depart America for Taiwan

2005-10-31T10:40:00.000-05:00

Two Kidd-class destroyers have departed the United States heading for Taiwan. Senior Navy officers report that the ships are on a war footing.

This is not a crisis, but rather a hand-over of the destroyers, which have been renamed the Keelung and Suao for service in the ROC Navy. The war footing is intended to train the Taiwanese crews in the use of their new vessel during the long journey from South Carolina.

The Taiwanese crews are wearing civilian clothes and flying an American flag until they reach the island of Guam. There they will don their ROCN uniforms and begin flying the flag of Taiwan.

These two destroyers are the first two in the package, with two more following close behind. The ships will improve ROC anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities and air-defense capabilities.

The Taipei Times and China Post both have articles on the destroyers.

[Military] [Taiwan] [US]

Woshan 10-A

2005-10-30T12:08:00.000-05:00

Jing of Those Who Dare posted not too long ago about China's indigenously developed and produced Woshan 10A turbofan engine. Jing finds the WS-10A engine to be comparable to the F-110 GE-129. Why should the production of such an outdated engine be noteworthy? To quote Jing:

This would put the Chinese at least 15 years behind the latest American engine technology, though it is a vast improvement from a decade ago where they were nearly 30 years behind.

Because of this technological gap, China has previously relied on foreign engines (from Rolls Royce or various Russian manufacturers) for its fighters--even those that it prided itself on having indigenously developed. China is apparently using this engine in its J-10 multirole fighters.

I don't know enough about engines to agree or disagree with the comparison of engines mentioned above. The Jamestown Foundation and Chinese Defense Today both describe the WS-10A as comparable to the Russian-made AL-31 engine used on the Su-27. That in itself is impressive considering their inability to produce any engine worth flying not long ago.

Anyone who knows anything about aircraft engines and/or China's ability to produce them, please comment with your thoughts. Is this a significant landmark representing Chinese technological advancement or just an outdated engine?

[China] [Military]

Dry Run

2005-10-29T09:58:00.000-05:00

Many Taiwanese military exercises are "scripted" (also known as fake or rigged).* Therefore, when a chance arrives to see the military in action against something under more realistic conditions, military analysts come out of the woodworks to watch. Today offers just such an opportunity and the result doesn't reflect well on ROC air power.

EastSouthWestNorth posts on a South Korean freighter which after a collision was leaking benzene into the air. Taiwan's Environmental Protection Agency called in the ROCAF, who deployed F-16s to drop 2,000 pound laser-guided bombs that failed to sink the freighter. Next a pair of AH-1W Super Cobras attacked with eight Hellfire missiles. At last sighting the freighter had still failed to sink completely. See ESWN's post for pictures.

As for the lessons learned, ESWN reports:

[T]he armchair generals are having a good time commenting about how these armed forces can fight a war when they cannot even sink a static capsized ship.

*For more on the scripted nature of Taiwan's military exercises, see this post on this year's Han Kuang exercise.

[Military] [Taiwan]

China's Universities

2005-10-29T00:19:00.000-05:00

It has been almost a decade since then President Jiang Zemin declared higher education to be a top priority of the Chinese government. In that time, funding for universities has more than doubled.

Chinese (and Indian) universities are starting to get the attention of globalization experts, who warn that American students aren't keeping up in engineering and the hard sciences. Thomas Friedman dedicated a whole chapter to the subject ("The Quiet Crisis") in his most recent book The World is Flat.

Howard French writes in the International Herald Tribune on China's efforts to develop Tsinghua, Peking University, and others into world-class universities. (Hat Tip: Simon World)

China's model is simple: recruit top foreign-trained Chinese and overseas-born ethnic Chinese to well-equipped labs, surround them with the brightest students and give them tremendous leeway.

Harvard, Cambridge, and the other American and British liberal arts universities atop the list of the world's best universities needn't worry, however.

China is focusing on science and technology, areas that reflect the country's development needs, but also reflect the preferences of an authoritarian system that restricts free speech. The liberal arts often involve critical thinking about politics, economics and history. The government has placed relatively little emphasis on achieving world-class status in these subjects. Yet, many Chinese say - most often indirectly - that the limits on academic debate could hamper efforts to create world-class universities.

For a broader look at education and what it takes to create a world class university, see this series of articles from The Economist. Specifically relevant to China is the discussion of the tradeoff between "massification" (expanding access to higher education) and developing excellence in elite institutions.

[China] [Education]

Who's Next?

2005-10-27T08:21:00.000-05:00

ROC Foreign Minister Mark Chen has offered his resignation because of Senegal's surprise switch of diplomatic recognition to China.

Chen said he felt "cheated" over the development given that Senegal had "repeatedly promised" that China's economic activity in the country would not affect its diplomatic relations with Taiwan. (Source)

In light of the surprise, officials in the Foreign Ministry and National Security Bureau are now warning of

concern that Taiwan's entire roster of allies would succumb to Beijing's diplomatic clout.

The most likely ally to fall next is the Vatican (Holy See). (On the other hand, I've been predicting that switch for months.)

Details are starting to come out about Senegal's switch:

[Senegalese President Abodoulaye] Wade said that "between countries, there are no friends, only interests."

The price tag for Senegal's switch: 600 million US dollars.

Updates:

The Times of London reports:
The Vatican is preparing to break its ties with Taiwan and establish diplomatic relations with mainland China, ending more than 50 years of mutual hostility with Beijing, The Times has learnt.
ESWN opines that the going rate in Taipei for a diplomatic ally is on the order of half a billion NTD annually (or 15 million USD).

Reply: Sun Bin analyzes Taiwan's diplomatic allies in order to attempt to answer this question.

[Senegal] [Taiwan] [Vatican]

25 and Counting (Down)

2005-10-26T07:40:00.000-05:00

Taiwan has lost yet another diplomatic ally. Coming Anarchy posts on Senegal changing its recognition to the People's Republic. Coming Anarchy sums up the situation nicely:

China and Taiwan do not keep diplomatic relations with states that recognize the other country. And with the growing importance of China's economy, countries are dumping Taiwan for China. The remaining 25 countries that recognize Taiwan are mostly small Latin American, African and Pacific nations attracted partly with pledges of investment or aid.

The BBC reports that Senegal is the sixth country to change over to China since President Chen took office. That is roughly one per year. It seems that slowly, but surely China is buying away all of Taiwan's allies. Mind you, this is not intended as a criticism of China. Taiwan is also buying many of its friends. The whole situation is one ongoing auction.

In light of the situation, diplomatic experts are offering Taiwan free advice. The consensus seems to be:

"If Taiwan wants to build their case for independence, then cutting ties with a country that recognizes the PRC is the last thing that they should be doing! All it does it reinforce the absurd one China policy. Instead, they should be encouraging dual recognition starting at these low levels before they take their case to the UN." (MutantFrog)

"reorient [Taiwan's] foreign policy away from an emphasis on the number of countries that recognize it and the treatment received by its leaders overseas and toward demonstrating to the international community it is a good global and regional citizen." (Former State Dept. Official)

[China] [Senegal] [Taiwan]

Retrocession Day

2005-10-25T10:35:00.000-05:00

Sixty years ago today, Japanese rule of Taiwan ended. To get an idea of the different things that this day means to different people, read these three very different articles:

BBC's Taiwan anniversary reignites row
Xinhua's WWII recovery of Taiwan celebrated across Straits
Taiwan News Online's Ambivalence reigns over Retrocession Day

These three articles show the Chinese position (Xinhua), DPP position (TNO), and disinterested foreigner position (BBC). The KMT position is covered in Xinhua. Ironic isn't it?

Update: For anyone confused by my use of the word "Retrocession" yesterday, President Chen offers a clarification:

The real meaning of 'retrocession' is Taiwanese having the freedom to rule their own country.

[China] [Taiwan]

Kinmen Island

2005-10-24T23:42:00.000-05:00

Today is the 56th anniversary of the Battle of Kuningtou. In honor of this great victory of the ROC Army, read a superbly-written explanation of the significance of Kinmen (Quemoy) Island by Jerome Keating.

For those of you wondering where you have seen reference of this battle before, it was probably here. I've previously used Kuningtou to explain why fishing boats will not play a decisive role in a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan (explained further here). Michael Turton's counter-example is Hainan Island, which you can read about here. We report... You decide.

[Military] [Taiwan]

Chinese Economic Numbers

2005-10-23T22:45:00.000-05:00

If the earlier discussion of Chinese defense expenditures didn't give you enough fictional economics for one week, China's third-quarter economic growth numbers are out.

The GDP figures recorded growth from July to September at 9.4 per cent, almost exactly on par with the first two quarters, which came in at 9.4 and 9.5 per cent respectively. [source]

Simon offers a great deconstruction of China's numbers by Jake van der Kamp. The Financial Times also has some doubts.

For those readers who aren't automatically skeptical upon seeing Chinese economic statistics of any variety:

Simon World has a great roundup explaining the generally fictious nature of China's economic statistics.

I previously blogged on fuel consumption contradicting growth statistics here. Especially relevant is this article from The New Republic cited therein, which sadly is available only to subscribers.

[China] [Economy]

Turton Takes Guardian to Task

2005-10-22T00:12:00.000-05:00

Michael Turton points out an all too common misunderstanding of Taiwan in the foreign media:

I have to admit that I am in despair over the simple inability of foreign columnists to get Taiwan right. I could list probably 30 blogs that whose writers have a more interesting and knowledgeable take on Taiwan, and well understand the issues surrounding the weapons purchase. This article from the Guardian puts out the same inane analysis that the others do, with a bonus error on the Taiwan Relations Act.

I am amazed by how many people misunderstand the Taiwan Relations Act and/or the general China-Taiwan situation. None of this is new... why all the confusion?

[Taiwan] [US FOR POL]

Chinese Defense Spending

2005-10-21T10:00:00.000-05:00

Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, on his recent visit to China, asked China to release its real defense expenditures. When prodded by Associated Press reporter Bob Burns during a question and answer session, Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan replied (through translator):

[T]his year's defense budget of China is some 29.56 billion U.S. dollars, and that's calculated according to the old official exchange rate between the Chinese Yuan and U.S. dollars. Introducing the new exchange rate, today's defense budget is at the level of 30.2 billion U.S. dollars. And I'm quite sure to tell you that that is indeed the true budget we have today. It is not necessary and not impossible [sic], actually, for us to massively increase the defense budget. (source)

I guess that clears it up then. American estimates, which differ by hundreds of percent in many cases, were off because of the two percent appreciation of the Yuan. (note the sarcasm)

Most PLA-watchers conclude that the numbers China gives for its defense expenditures are unrealisitically low. Sinologist David Shambaugh has concluded:

Few areas of Chinese military affairs are more opaque and difficult to research than the revenue/expenditure and budget/finance domains--but perhaps none is more important to understand. (Modernizing China's Military, 184)

Deadpen at Project China recently collected some different estimates of Chinese defense spending showing how confusing and varied the estimates were. There are a couple of reasons for the variation:

Ideas differ as to what numbers should be included in 'defense spending.'
The PLA has multiple sources of revenue.

In his defense, Minister Cao did caveat his answer, saying:

[S]ome funding for the development of certain equipments is not calculated in our defense budget, that is true. For example, the funding for the manned space mission, Shenzhou VI, is not calculated as part of the defense budget.

That is a good start but far from sufficient. In addition to the space program, China's official defense budget overlooks

a wide variety of military accounting items commonly included in Western budgets:
Procurement of weapons from abroad
Expenses for paramilitaries (People's Armed Police)
Nuclear weapons and strategic rocket programs
State subsidies for the defense-industrial complex
Some defense-related research and development
Extra-budget revenue (yusuanwai).

That quote comes from the most complete analysis I've seen of the Chinese defense budget: RAND's Modernizing China's Military, which is available free online. Chapter four of that text will tell you more than you ever wanted to know about Chinese defense numbers and certainly more than you will ever get out of China's Ministry of National Defense.

Update: Sun Bin offers this article critiquing many Western estimates of Chinese defense expenditures.

[China] [Military] [Rumsfeld]

No Beijing-Washington Hotline

2005-10-21T08:44:00.000-05:00

According to Bill Gertz, China has rejected a request from Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to create a direct line between senior leaders in Beijing and the White House. The line, which would be similar to the "Red Phone" in the Cold War, would threaten Chinese security because

the communications channel will permit U.S. intelligence agencies to trace the location of senior Chinese decision makers who use the telephone.

Lest readers think that paranoia is the only thing preventing the creation of such a hotline, Gertz offers another explanation:

One official also told us that another reason China's military is opposed to a direct telephone link with the Pentagon is that "anyone who answers the phone can't make a decision."

Update: Japan is asking for a hotline as well. The response is predictable.

[China] [US]

Unknown Story Over China

2005-10-20T17:38:00.000-05:00

Keith Windschuttle compares Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China (1937) and Jung Chang and Jon Halliday's Mao: The Unknown Story (2005). Not surprisingly he comes down on the side of the latter.

Snow's book played a major role in converting public opinion in both America and Europe towards a more favorable view of Mao. Its biggest impact, however, was within China itself, where it had a profound influence on radical youth. [...] The story that drew them there, however, was a fiction. The new biography Mao: The Unknown Story by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday shows that every major claim made by Snow was false.

Many of the points from Unknown Story that Windschuttle cites to refute Red Star have been questioned, but I have to agree that the accusation of bias and disinformation against Snow seem to be accurate. That makes the hero-worship (in some sectors) of Snow all the more worrying:

On the left of politics, Snow is still widely regarded today as a heroic figure, both for his writings in the 1930s and for the persecution he suffered in the 1950s from investigations by J. Edgar Hoover and Senator Joseph McCarthy, which forced him to flee the United States for Switzerland. He is still held up in schools of journalism as a model practitioner. In the past decade he has been the subject of no few- er than three book-length biographies, all published by American university presses and all favorable. The University of Missouri proudly advertises that it holds his collected papers in its archives.

In addition to comparing the two texts, he does a good job explaining the atrocities of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao, for those wishing to learn more about that part of Chinese history.

Hat Tip: Simon World

Update: Here is the New York Times review of Mao: The Unknown Story and another by NYT columnist Nicholas Kristof. (Hat Tips: Peking Duck)

[Books] [China]

Politics Trumps Health

2005-10-20T10:56:00.000-05:00

As happens again and again when Taiwan is concerned, political considerations have trumped health concerns. Mad Minerva posts on the first case of bird flu in Taiwan (it was smuggled onto the island) and Canada's refusal to allow Taiwan to participate in an upcoming conference on coordinating the international response to the avian flu. Does this sound familiar to anyone else?

Hint: SARS outbreak. Taiwan. WHO. Ringing any bells?

Update:Mad Minerva praises Taiwan for mass-producing Tamiflu. Marginal Revolution has some thoughts on why stockpiles of Tamiflu, while beneficial, aren't the panacea many people think that it is.

[Bird Flu] [Canada] [Taiwan]

Blocking and Unblocking

2005-10-20T09:39:00.000-05:00

The latest reports from behind the Great Firewall of China indicate that Wikipedia has been blocked and Blogspot has been unblocked. There are additional reports that Google's cache is now accessible in China.

Some people are trying to make sense out of the changes, wondering if this is a result of some deal made by Google (who runs Blogspot). That seems unlikely considering the recent decision of Google Maps.

[Censorship] [China]

The 88s

2005-10-19T23:44:00.000-05:00

Using Blogger's Blog Search, I have recently stumbled across a few blogs that I had never noticed before. The most notable of the new blogs (or at least new to me) that I have found is The 88s. The site, which covers a mix of topics, has quite a few great posts related to China.

The first post that caught my attention was The 9 Men Who Run China, which looks at the members of the Politburo Standing Committee and concludes:

"All nine are engineers.
Only one was educated outside of China (Luo Gan), and in East Germany of all places.
There are no women on the PSC.
All nine are Han Chinese.
6 out of 9 are Jiang proteges.
4 out of 9 went to Qinghua.
Gigantic Coke-bottle glasses are standard issue on the PSC."

After analyzing the current bunch, The 88s looks ahead, offering some thoughts on who will lead the Fifth Generation but I won't rip off everything written there. You'll have to follow the link for the rest.

Another post that is certainly worthy of a read is Theory vs. Reality. Included in that post are some guidelines for understanding China:

"If you don't speak/read Chinese, forget it.*
If you don't understand that Chinese politics is an outgrowth of Chinese culture in many ways, forget it.
If you don't understand how local government works in China, forget it.
If you don't understand where China was 30 years ago, forget it.
If you get hung up on the word "communism," forget it.
If you can't accept contradiction, forget it."

Go give those posts and the rest of the blog a read.

*If not being able to speak Chinese is hampering your China analysis, try some Chinese lessons at ChinesePod. (Hat Tip: Simon World)

[China]

Chinese Invasion Critique

2005-10-19T15:09:00.000-05:00

As promised in my last post, here are my thoughts on Michael Turton's China invasion scenario.

A lot of this argument has already been covered in in our back and forth on China's ability to invade Taiwan last July and thus will not be addressed again.

The latest RUMINT states that American war plans call for two or three American aircraft carriers within striking distance of the Taiwan Strait within 72 hours. When the first act of terrorism/sabotage is conducted, forces will be alerted. China would need to have overwhelming force in place before the US can respond and even with a large number of commandos/spies planted in Taiwan in advance, I seriously doubt their ability to accomplish that. Once America gets into place, America's F/A-18 Hornets would put a serious hamper on China's ability to conduct troop insertion and resupply by air and could begin to attrit China's surface ships. [whether or not America will intervene is addressed below]

The plan to cover-up invasion preparations under the guise of an exercise is not particularly new. I'm guessing that the Taiwanese have thought of that and that whenever the Chinese are conducting exercises anywhere near the Strait Central Line and Taiwanese waters, a large number of Taiwanese fighters are on alert.

Chinese planes are attacking power facilities and the like in Turton's scenario. This is no longer a decapitation-style strike, but rather a full-fledged war, I guess. The Minnick piecehad planned to take the island intact, I guess that is one place where Turton's scenario differs. I don't doubt China's ability to blow up a lot of stuff, but I don't think it would be an efficient use of resources for an aggressor with a limited window of attack. On the topic of dams, I'm not sure that China would want to legitimize dams as a target considering they also have large dams that could be hit. This isn't to say they wouldn't do it; just that I wouldn't call it wise.

I'm sorry to see that Turton has such little faith in the ROC military. The willingness of those soldiers to fight, however, is something that can't be proven either way until the event occurs and hopefully we will never know. I am confident in most of the men and women of the ROC armed forces that I know and of their willingness to fight.
Additionally, loyalty and political ideology all tend to fade away in the face of someone shooting at you and bombing your house. In a all-out attack like the one described, I think the military will fight back out of self-preservation if for no other reason. I would say that the military remaining inactive is more plausible in a decapitation strike like Minnick describes but still not likely.

When dealing with airborne insertions, the shortage will not be soldiers. As Turton notes, any ground pounder can be taught quickly to jump from an airplane (or just pushed out of one). China's shortage, however, will be airplanes. According to David Shambaugh's Modernizing China's Military, China's military is so short on airlift capability that even its rapid reaction forces deploy domestically by train or road (158). I don't have any numbers on China's airlift capability but I'm pretty sure it is a small number and I seriously doubt the ability of the PLA to airdrop in any heavy weaponry (tanks and artillery), meaning they would be throwing a few lightly armored airborne troops against a modern heavy army.

The targets hit and the order of their attack seems reasonable to me, but that doesn't say much as I haven't spent much time thinking of how to conquer the island.

We've been through the sealift argument before with Hainan and Kuningtou (Kinmen) as our case studies. I would just add that coming ashore at Taiwan's ports would certainly be easier, but one must take the ports first and that wouldn't be as easy as he seems to think, in my estimation. I guess the ROC military units defection and treachery he predicts is why that could be accomplished so easily because the military knows what would happen if they gave up a few ports.
All of Phase 2 may be a waste of time, however, as it seems that the ROCA, ROCN, and ROCAF have already thrown in the towel in this scenario.

Turton writes:
Taiwanese units have begun to slowly recover from their disorganization and inherent incompetence.
It is a good thing that the PLA forces don't have either of those because that would seriously undermine their ability to conduct these fantastic maneuvers.

Minnick writes:
Taiwan's military is rife with lethargic and ineffectual troops just begging for their 20-month tour of duty to end so they can go back to their girlfriends and jobs.
Once again it must be noted that this also applies to China. Conscripts make up roughly 65% of the Chinese military (MCM, 153). Do they not have girlfriends that they want to be with?

Turton's comments on Cadet Hung Wanting, who is performing quite well at the finest military academy in the world are misleading. She had one year of training at the ROC Military Academybefore attending West Point. Just because something is not trained in land navigation or spends insufficient time on life-fire marksmanship as a freshmen, does not mean it is not taught and/or emphasized at all in the country's military.

Turton notes:
Xinhua, despite being openly and obviously controlled by the Communist government of China, has quietly become an important source of news for Western newspapers, who, incredibly, cite it as if it were a news supplier and not a propaganda organ.
This is true and regrettable.

Finally, Turton rightly questions whether or not America would intervene at all. He cites an overstretched US military and China's holdings of American dollars. I seriously doubt that either factor will affect America's response. If America does not respond, it won't be because China has T-bills. With Bush in the White House, I'd say it is a safe bet that America would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend itself." Under President Clinton or whoever is elected in 2008, I'm not so confident that America would do the right thing, but under Bush I think America's response is clear.

In summation, I disagree with most of Turton's conclusions. It would be much harder for China to invade than depicted. It seems that every advantage has been given to the Chinese forces and the Taiwanese have been underestimated at every turn. I don't know that we should fear 2008 any more or less than any other year, but I think it is a pretty safe bet that we won't see the events described on Turton's blog that year.

[China] [Military] [Taiwan]

Chinese Invasion

2005-10-18T08:16:00.000-05:00

Michael Turton of The View From Taiwan has written an in-depth analysis of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan worthy of being bound and sold in bookstores. As soon as I have had a chance to digest his conclusions I'll have a reply, but for now I just want to recommend it to everyone as a top-notch intellectual exercise.

Other great posts coming from Turton as of late include:

Taiwan Navy to Add Missile Craft

US Admiral Wants Sanity in Weapons Purchase

Turton's Editorial in the Taipei Times: US Picking on Wrong Target

All three are well worth a read (as is Turton's blog in general).

[China] [Military] [Taiwan]

Shenzhou VI

2005-10-12T16:22:00.000-05:00

Shenzhou VI took off successfully earlier today carrying lieutenant colonels Fei Junlong and Nie Haisheng into space. For continuing coverage of the space flight, check out the following sites:

Peking Duck has an interesting post on the subject which looks at the media coverage. China Confidential also writes about the launch.

[China] [Space]

The Eight Submarines

2005-10-12T08:54:00.000-05:00

The special budget that would allow Taiwan to purchase numerous significant weapon systems from the United States is once again being discussed in the news and blogosphere. Michael Turton of The View from Taiwan reports that PACOM commander Admiral William Fallon has recommended that the submarines be removed from the special budget in order to facilitate its passage. That does not appear to be the case. From the Washington Times article under discussion:

The officers said the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. William J. Fallon, had encouraged Taiwan to strengthen its defenses with increased spending, a better command structure, more joint training, and defensive missiles, mines and helicopters.

After studying Taiwan's defenses, the U.S. officers said, the admiral has urged the Taiwanese forces to acquire more missiles for their fighter-interceptor jet aircraft, ground-based anti-aircraft missiles, attack helicopters and mines to defend the beaches against amphibious invaders and transport helicopters to move troops against invading paratroopers.

The officers suggested that the arms package featuring offensive weapons such as diesel-electric submarines, anti-submarine patrol planes and destroyers, which the Bush administration offered to sell Taiwan in 2001, be allowed to fade away.

"The officers" in question are anonymous "Senior officers of the U.S. Pacific Command" not Admiral Fallon. It is not inconceivable that Fallon supports cutting the submarines given his background (he is a career naval aviator), but that isn't what the article says.

On the call to cut the subs from the special budget, Turton comments:

It's high time senior US decisionmakers started talking sense on this topic. Subs are useless as deterrents for invasion -- especially when they will arrive in dribs and drabs over 10 years, making a grand total of 8. Pundits often quote "But the best weapon to hunt another sub with is a sub" without really thinking through the implications. HINT: If we're subhunting, which nation do you want to be -- the one that operates dozens of subs, or the one that operates eight? The fact is that this axiom is a two-edged sword, and the Chinese side is a lot sharper.

As I am one of the "pundits" in question (see my previous post), allow me to defend the submarine purchase. Not buying new submarines surrenders control of everything under the sea to China (although Taiwan could still conduct anti-submarine warfare from the surface or sky). China currently has the world's largest submarine force (55 submarines), if not the most potent (America's 54 nuclear submarines are far more capable), and is still growing rapidly even as it retires its older Romeos. Surrendering everything subsurface waters isn't particularly wise. To put it mildly, I wouldn't want to be in a surface ship when the opponent is dominant underneath me. Submariners have a saying:

There are two types of ships: submarines and targets.

Turton advocates reallocating the money for submarines to fighters, but the point remains that there is no money for the subs hence the current standstill. I would advocate fixing weaknesses before maximizing strengths, even though both are certainly important.

[Military] [Taiwan]

Chinese Growth

2005-10-12T07:52:00.000-05:00

According to most economists, China is growing at just shy of 10 percent per annum. (For an alternate evaluation, see this post.) There are numerous explanations for this meteoric rise and its sustainability, the simplest of which is that the country was so messed up for so long that removing the impediments to growth results in break-neck growth.

Logan at Survived SARS has a great post entitled "China's New Growth Model" that examines the drivers of Chinese growth that is well worth a read.

The China Daily article he cites proposes

[China] should instead move towards the model adopted by developed countries -- depending more on technological innovations and less on resources and labor for growth

Go and read the rest.

[China] [Economy]

Special Budget Tabled for 32nd Time

2005-10-05T07:47:00.000-05:00

There has been considerable effort in the United States to send a message to Taiwan on the importance of the special budget (the most recent example being Congressman Chabot). Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has tried time and again to get the budget for arms (now including eight submarines and 12 sub-hunting aircraft) to the floor of the Legislative Yuan for a debate. The Pan-Blue Coalition, which includes the Kuomintang (KMT) and People First Party (PFP), has prevented this from happening by tabling the motion repeatedly.

The Blues have previously tried to portray this as a principled stand against over-priced weaponry that isn't needed because Taiwan can trust China's intentions. Many, however, suspect that stonewalling the special budget, which was originally a KMT initiative, is part of a larger initiative to prevent the passage of any DPP sponsored legislation or action from passing the legislature. Jujuflop has blogged on the effect of this policy on the Control Yuan. Today's Taipei Times shows informs us that the special budget is just one of many bills being held from debate.

The committee voted in favor of tabling the stymied arms procurement bill along with 17 other bills proposed by the DPP and its small ally, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).

That seems to lend support to the general obstructionist theory.

One additional piece from the article worth considering:

The PFP has threatened to push the party asset bill through for legislative review if the KMT breaks ranks with it on the arms bill, which the PFP adamantly opposes.That bill is designed to compel the KMT to return its stolen party assets to the public and state coffers.

Whether you see that as extortion or horse-trading, I guess is a matter of perspective, but it doesn't seem like the Blues are particularly friendly at the moment.

[Taiwan] [Taiwan Politics]

Neoconservative Approach to China

2005-10-03T22:18:00.000-05:00

The latest issue of The Weekly Standard has an article by Max Boot that outlines what America's policy toward China should be. It basically outlines the Neoconservative approach, a perspective for which I feel some affection.

Beyond containment, deterrence, and economic integration lies a strategy that the British never employed against either Germany or Japan--internal subversion. Sorry, the polite euphemisms are "democracy promotion" and "human rights protection," but these amount to the same thing: The freer China becomes, the less power the Communist oligarchy will enjoy.

This reminds me of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which is credited in Sharansky's The Case for Democracy with playing a large role in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The amendment

denied Normal Trade Relations to certain countries with non-market economies that restricted emigration rights. [Wikipedia]

As Sharansky said of the amendment:

in a closed society, freedom of emigration lowers the degree of control a regime can exercise over its subjects. When people have a right to leave a country, Sakharov explained, they are less afraid and more independent, they are more willing to stand up for the rights that everyone is being denied. [116]

Granted, the Max Boot article is advocating undermining the government's control not through immigration, but in other ways, but the end goal is the same. Specifically, Boot recommends:

The United States should aim to "Taiwanize" the mainland--to spread democracy through such steps as increased radio broadcasts and Internet postings. [...] American technology should be used to crack open, not cement, the authority of the Communist party. The United States needs to step up spending for the Chinese service of the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, the National Endowment for Democracy, and other organizations that aim to penetrate the Bamboo Curtain.

This could potentially reap benefits around the world. While China is the leader in censoring the internet, others do so as well.

In 2004 Congress allocated $1 million for a trial grant to the Broadcasting Board of Governors for a project to circumvent Beijing's Internet controls. That work needs to be greatly expanded. As suggested by the congressionally chartered U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, we need to create an Office of Global Internet Freedom within the executive branch that would work on undermining government controls on the web not only in China but also in dictatorships from Cuba to Syria.

Many bloggers are doing their part to ensure the free flow of information into China by creating mirror sites. Perhaps the government should step up their efforts as well.

Update: Survived SARS looks at the same article here.

[Censorship] [China]

USNA Prof Speaks on China-Taiwan

2005-10-03T16:57:00.000-05:00

Mad Minerva blogs on a recent speech by Dr. Yu Maochun who teaches at the United States Naval Academy (USNA). The speech covered historical, security, diplomatic, and economic issues.
A few excerpts:

Recently a PLA general listed 6 consequences that would happen if China attacked Taiwan: Number one on the list: the loss of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing. Number two: the loss of the 2010 World's Fair in Shanghai. Note that there is no mention on that list of Taiwan economic issues.[...] But if the PRC decides to use force, it will do so at any cost.

Any synopsis of this speech won't do it justice though, so check out the whole thing.

[China] [Taiwan]

Chabot on Arms Sale

2005-09-29T09:03:00.000-05:00

Congressman Steve Chabot (R, OH) has impeccable pro-Taiwan credentials. Chabot was the co-founder of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus.

During a talk at the Heritage Foundation, Chabot joined the chorus of those inside and outside the US government calling on Taiwan to purchase the arms offered them in 2001.

I want to be very frank with you: I am very disappointed that this special budget has languished

The special arms budget currently consists of eight submarines and 12 sub-hunting aircraft, as the other elements of the sale (eg: Patriot missiles) have been relocated to the annual defense budget. (For more information on the sale and its importance, see this post)

Chabot continued:

If this doesn't move forward in the near future, there are many members of Congress here who may reevaluate their support, the extent of their support to Taiwan.

While I certainly understand Chabot's frustration, I don't think that such comments are helpful. It only reinforces the impression, that I discussed in a previous post on Richard Halloran's article, that America's friendship can be bought one arms contractor at a time. Chabot's speech was certainly the "American version" of the argument I discuss in the Halloran post, but it will certainly be interpretted in accordance with the "Taiwanese version."

I certainly agree with many of Chabot's points, such as:

If Taiwan is strong, it will probably never be militarily tested. If Taiwan is weak, the challenge may come sooner than you think.

Having said that, I don't think this speech is going to help and it will probably hurt America's image in Taiwan and elsewhere.

[Taiwan] [US FOR POL]

Fighting Censorship

2005-09-28T23:05:00.000-05:00

Econblogger Survived SARS reports that he appears to be blocked by the Great Firewall of China. If could very well be that Typepad has been blocked en masse, but I can't keep track of which blog service is blocked this week. Either way, what makes this especially noteworthy, in my opinion, is his response:

Some people try to circumvent the web censors (reverse engineered from Cisco technology, thanks guys) and web nannies by writing words like "democracy" as dem0cr@cy or something like that, and thereby evading the keyword-sensitive censors. I'm not going to do this.

Instead of such games, he decides to attack the problem head on.

I think a better solution is to try to overload the censors using paragraphs such as the following: China democracy Tibet Falun Gong Taiwan independence Anti-Japan demonstrations protests Chen Shui-bian DPP Taiping Rebellion Chen Yonglin Zhao Ziyang China exchange rate speculation Hu Yaobang Wei Jingsheng democracy Radio Free Asia Voice of America 6/4/89 4/6/76 4/6/89 6/4/76 Three Gorges cracks Fang Lizhi democracy freedom Falun Gong anti-Japan nationalism embassy bombing democracy

I can't really claim to be helping overload the sensors since Blogger is already banned. I guess a mass movement to post that text on every anti-censorship China blog wouldn't help because it would just help the censors find them all and block them more effectively.

A better solution is to download and read the latest report from Reporters Without Borders on how to circumvent censors. There is useful information in there for everyone from the definition of a blog to technical information on promoting your blog and using proxies.

[Censorship] [China]

Greatest Hits

2005-09-25T09:00:00.000-05:00

In honor of this auspicious day, I have compiled a collection of MeiZhongTai's top ten greatest hits. If you have been reading since the early days, this is a good chance to reminisce. If, on the other hand, you are new to MeiZhongTai, then this is a chance to read some of the posts that you missed. (in chronological order)

Starting Point offers a mission statement of sorts for this blog.

USAF vs. Sukhoi's Best compares the American F-16 to the Sukhoi fighters currently in service in numerous Asian countries, including China.

ShaShouJian studies the Chinese concept often translated as "Assassin's Mace."

Killing a Carrier examines the People's Liberation Army Navy's efforts to be able to sink an American aircraft carrier in the event of a war.

Chinese AWACS discusses the origins of China's airborne early warning aircraft.

Can China Invade Taiwan? is a four-part debate with Michael Turton of The View from Taiwan on China's ability to invade Taiwan.

Taiwan's Silicon Shield examines the thesis that Taiwan's high-tech industry makes it too important for the major powers to abandon in the event of a war.

Protection Money? studies the arms offered by the United States for purchase by Taiwan in order to better understand the purpose behind the sale.

Exploring the Spratlys looks at recent Chinese exploration of the Spratly Islands and considers possible foreign policy implications.

How Invisible is Stealth? examines China's efforts to counter America's stealth advantage.

[China] [Taiwan]

A Deeper Look at China Watching

2005-09-25T08:20:00.000-05:00

Today is a special day at MeiZhongTai. In honor of this day, we will take a look at China watching and some of the pitfalls that we face, and try to avoid. But first, an anecdote:

Journalist Roy Rowan, in his travels in China during the Chinese Civil War, came in contact with Sir John Keswick, who headed Jardine Matheson and the Sino-British Trade Council. Keswick gave Rowan a book entitled What I Know About China, which he had published at his own expense. Upon opening the book, Rowan found all of its pages to be blank.

Many of us in the English-language China blogosphere like to think of ourselves as 'China Watchers,' China analysts, or something akin to the 'China Hands' of yesteryear, but few of us would claim to know any more about China than Sir Keswick. We tend to avoid the title 'China expert,' not just out of humility but because no mere mortal could truly claim to understand so much.

Being China analysts, we must be wary of falling prey to the same mistakes and biases as other regional specialists. I recently stumbled across an interesting article from the CIA's Studies in Intelligence entitled "Thinking Straight: Cognitive Bias in the US Debate about China." It is a quite interesting look at the pitfalls that analysts make in trying to understand and predict the actions of another country and their foreign policy implications, using China watching as a case study.

One quote I found to be particularly enlightening:

[T]he more blurred and multifaceted our perceptions of China become, the closer we may be to that most elusive thing: the truth.
-Jonathan Spence

The author, Josh Kerbel, encourages us to "stop trying to think straight." I'll do my best.

[China] [CIA]

Third of a Year Anniversary

2005-09-25T07:55:00.000-05:00

Today marks four months of blogging here at MeiZhongTai. This blog has had well over 4,500 hits from over fifty different countries in that time.

I would like to thank all of the bloggers in my blogroll for their help in making MeiZhongTai a success. Special thanks goes to David at One Whole Jujuflop Situation for being the first blogger to blogroll me and to Michael at The View from Taiwan for sending me the most traffic. Of course I must also thank all my readers, especially regular commenters Aaron, Mad Minerva, and the bloggers already mentioned. Every comment is appreciated, so those of you I didn't mention by name... thank you too!

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome a couple new bloggers. Taiwan's Other Side and Sun Bin have both recently been added to my blogroll and are both up-and-coming blogs. (Sun Bin appears to have been around as long as I have, but I just recently found him, so he is still a recent addition.)

In addition to these thank yous and links, I am celebrating MeiZhongTai's third-of-a-year anniversary by adding Technorati tags to all my posts (a work in progress). I hope I am doing this right because in spite of all my effort, I haven't seen a single post of mine show up on Technorati.

[Technorati]

Li Ao Said What?

2005-09-23T07:58:00.000-05:00

Depending on which report you read, Taiwanese author and politician Li Ao said any number of seemingly conflicting things on his visit to China. For just a flavor of the possibilities, I'll offer some headlines:

Taiwan author riles China with acid speech Reuters.
Gadfly Taiwan writer calls for more academic freedom in address to mainland students Associated Press.
China Lectured by Taiwan Ally New York Times
Taiwan writer Li Ao thanks CPC for China's prosperity Xinhua
Li Ao wants Chinese Communist Party to rule 1,000 years China Post (Taiwan).

So what did Li Ao actually say? Instead of spending all day trying to form a composite from reading those very different articles, just read the transcripts. EastSouthWestNorth has been kind enough to offer English translations of his speeches at both Beijing University and Tsinghua University. For anyone interested in China-Taiwan issues, these make quite an interesting read.

[China] [Taiwan]

How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Greens

2005-09-22T13:10:00.000-05:00

Sun Bin, one of the newest additions to my blogroll, has previously posted on why Taiwan should not take actions toward independence. (My reply is here.) Now, he offers a quote from Lao Zi to further explain his point:

There was once a saying among those who wielded armies: 'I'd rather be a guest than a host, much rather retreat a foot than advance an inch.' This is called 'marching without marching, rolling up sleeves without baring arms, raising swords without brandishing weapons, entering battle without facing an enemy.' There's no greater calamity than dishonoring an enemy.

This seems to me to smell a lot like advocating appeasement. For clarification, one might look to the policy recommendations that he is supporting with this quote:

If Taiwan does nothing, after a few decades, its threat may disappear and the problem [is] resolved by itself (as mainland China changes)

He is simply advocating that the status quo be maintained. That couldn't be appeasement, could it? Yes, I would argue, it is. Appeasement is defined by Merriam Webster as

pacifiy, conciliate; especially : to buy off (an aggressor) by concessions usually at the sacrifice of principles

To not move toward independence in order to avoid a confrontation is to appease an enemy.* It matters not whether the enemy has compelled you to take action in accordance with its wishes (compellance) or convinced you not to take an action of which it doesn't approve (deterrence), giving in to such threats is appeasement.

What is wrong with appeasement, you might ask. Instead of the obvious response (see e.g. Munich, 1938), I'll reply with a recommended read: If You Give a Mouse a Cookie. For those of you who don't have a large number of children's books at your disposal, I'll provide cliff notes. If you give a mouse a cookie, he will ask for a glass of milk. If you give a mouse a glass of milk, he will ask for...

It could be alternately worded as 'give someone an inch and they will take a mile.' In international relations it is the principle that appeasing agressors is a bad idea. No offense to the ancient Chinese authors but I think Numeroff and her mouse have Lao Zi and Sun Zi both on this one.

Now, it is entirely possible that Sun Bin advocates the status quo for other reasons. He could be ideologically opposed to independence and thus not guilty of appeasement at all, because he is advocating a policy in line with his own beliefs that just happens to concur with that of the threatening power. That is not the argument he is making, however. Advocating that Taiwan maintain the status quo simply out of pragmatism or fear is appeasement, in my opinion. Am I wrong?

*To not move toward independence because you don't want Taiwan to be an independent nation is not, of course, appeasement. Those who support reunification or the status quo because of their ideology are appeasing no one. Those who advocate a policy simply to avoid conflict with an opponent, however, could be charged with appeasement.

[China] [Taiwan]

Zoellick on China's Rise

2005-09-22T10:29:00.000-05:00

Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick bluntly warned China last night that it must begin to take concrete steps to address what he called a 'a cauldron of anxiety' in the United States and other parts of the world about Chinese intentions.

So begins the article from today's Washington Post that I predict will cause Thomas Barnett's head to explode. I have previously blogged on Dr. Barnett's tendency to go apoplectic anytime someone describes China as anything resembling a threat (and his tendency to use foul language to do so). In one of the posts of his that I cited (available here), Barnett had this to say about Zoellick:

I've said it before and I say it again: Zoellick is by far the smartest man in the Bush Administration. Honest to God, I'd name him president tomorrow.

I could be misreading this all as I have been unable to find a full transcript of his speech, but it seems to me that Zoellick is now taking a harder line on China, something that will undoubtedly upset Dr. Barnett. I report, you decide. Zoellick continued:

Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the United States -- and others as well -- to hedge relations with China... Many countries hope China will pursue a 'peaceful rise,' but none will bet their future on it.

Update: Did the quotes in the WaPo article linked accurately represent the entirety of Zoellick's speech? Decide for yourself. The transcript is now available at the State Department website.

[China] [US FOR POL]

Respect the ROC

2005-09-19T21:28:00.000-05:00

I recently stumbled across an informative article entitled "Don't Belittle Taiwan's Effort to Defend Itself," which was originally published in Wall Street Journal Asia about two weeks ago. (Hat Tip: TaiwanMilitary.org)

Time and again, in meeting after meeting, one hears the following refrain from American policy experts when talking about Taiwan: "If they aren't serious about defending themselves, why should we risk our blood and treasure to help them fend off a Chinese attack?" The proximate cause for this and similar remarks is that Taiwan has not yet purchased a major package of military systems offered in 2001 by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush. That package includes eight diesel submarines, 12 P-3 submarine-hunting planes, and several batteries of PAC-3 anti-missile missiles. The delay is all too often used to convey the impression that Taiwan is free riding, counting on U.S. carriers and jets (and of course American sailors and airmen) to deter China rather than relying on its own efforts.

There has been so much attention paid to this one weapons package, at this blog and elsewhere, that many sinologists are accusing the ROC of free-riding--a charge which is clearly not the case. The ROC military is a potent fighting force that the people of Taiwan can be proud of.

While there is plenty of blame to go around, the least guilty party in finalizing the purchase has been the Chen administration. Although the Bush team should be lauded for approving the sale of systems that had been denied by the Clinton administration, it was always unrealistic to think Taiwan could absorb $30 billion worth of new weapon systems in a short period when its procurement and acquisition budget has historically averaged $400-500 million a year.

I don't know that the cost is the problem. While the weapons are certainly expensive, recent KMT hijinks leads me to believe the KMT takes their opposition role more seriously than their legislating one.

[T]he idea that the Chen administration is not serious about defending Taiwan is largely a tale told by sinologists and American government officials who would like an excuse for the problem of Taiwan to just go away.

Don't get caught in this delusion. Recognize the commitment of the government and the military to defense of the island (and the KMT determination to ensure that doesn't happen).

[Taiwan] [Military]

Only Greens Need Arms?

2005-09-16T20:01:00.000-05:00

There seems to be a new argument making the rounds about the arms purchase proposed by the Ministry of National Defense and supported by the Pan-Greens. The general thesis is that Taiwan only needs a potent military force if it is planning on declaring independence. Were it true, this would go a long way toward explaining why the Pan-Blues have been blocking the arms purchase.

Sun Bin's post on "Taiwan's Defense Options" offers two alternatives:

Taiwan has 2 defense options:
Plan on declaring independence, and prepare for a war. In this case perhaps $15bn of weapon will not be enough, not even $150bn

Quietly maintain the status quo, do whatever it like of self rule, even preach democracy to the mainland, just don't declare independence. There will not be a war, and hence no need to get into an arms race. From CCP's perspective, their focus is on economic development. The last thing they want to see is a war, or even an arms race.

Sun Bin offered similar comments to a previous MeiZhongTai blogpost.

The underlying assumption seems to be that Taiwan doesn't need a strong military unless it is planning to declare independence. While James Soong would seem to agree, I'm not as trusting. First of all, independence is only one of many tripwires that China has laid. China has also promised to 'intervene' if:

Taiwan makes a military alliance with a foreign power, there is internal turmoil in Taiwan, Taiwan gains weapons of mass destruction, or Taiwan refuses to negotiate on the basis of "one China". (Recently, the PRC warned that if the situation in Taiwan becomes worse and spirals out of control, they will not look on "indifferently.") [source]

While a few of those reasons are entirely within Taiwan's control, Beijing is reserving the right to attack the island if it doesn't like what happens on the island (internal turmoil) or it gets bored (no movement on 'one China'). So it seems that even if one could trust a prospective enemy saying there won't be a war (you can't), it still isn't time to scream "Peace in our Time" from the rooftops.

Even if the PRC and ROC were at peace and could be assured that the peace would continue for the foreseeable future, Taiwan would still want a formidable military force to allow diplomatic negotiations with foreign powers from a position of strength. Taiwan has recently used its navy in a show of support for Taiwanese fishermen in disputed waters--something that did not involve China in any way. If Taiwan and China were to negotiate on any issue, be it independence or fruit exports, the relative hard and soft power of the two nations would come into play.

It is only natural that a state keep as potent a military force as it can reasonably afford. Taiwan needs these weapons. The Greens don't need them. The Blues don't need them. Taiwan needs them. To deny the country the weapons it needs to defend itself and bargain, in order to further your party's political bickering is petty and dangerous.

[Military] [Taiwan] [Taiwan Politics]

Internet: The Great Democratizer

2005-09-15T07:21:00.000-05:00

An article from The Guardian entitled 'Thanks to corporations, instead of democracy we get Baywatch" shows how the internet has the potential to be a democratizing force, but one that can be and is manipulated by the Chinese government. (Hat Tip: Peking Duck)

Many have claimed that thanks to the internet, all walls will come down and the people of the world are now on the fast track to freedom. Thomas Friedman, an admitted technological determinist, has written:

Thanks to satellite dishes, the internet and television... we can now see through, hear through and look through almost every conceivable wall... no one owns the internet, it is totally decentralised, no one can turn it off... China's going to have a free press... Oh, China's leaders don't know it yet, but they are being pushed straight in that direction.

This Guardian article stacks up all the evidence countering Friedman and is certainly worth a read for anyone who doesn't actively follow the news on Chinese censorship of the internet.

[China] [Democracy] [Internet]

Interpreting China's Rise

2005-09-09T08:54:00.000-05:00

The last day or so has offered up many different interpretations of China's rise. Among those opining were former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kwan Yew, Journalist Howard French, China scholar Michael Pillsbury, and the potty-mouthed panda hugger Thomas Barnett.*

Lee Kwan Yew, possibly best known for his controversial advocacy of "Asian Values," gave an interview to the German magazine Der Spiegel. He deals with a wide variety of issues facing Asia, including the rise of China. The interview has been translated into English and is available in its entirety here. Excerpt:
In 50 years I see China, Korea and Japan at the high-tech end of the value chain. Look at the numbers and quality of the engineers and scientists they produce and you know that this is where the R&D will be done. The Chinese have a space programme, they're going to put a man on the Moon and nobody sold them that technology. We have to face that. But you should not be afraid of that.

Howard French, reporting from Singapore, brings us a wonderful summary of different views on China's "peaceful rise." Excerpt:
Recent Chinese statements on its critical relationship with the United States have tried to deflect perceptions of a brewing confrontation by projecting China as a 'force for peace.' Such statements highlight the carefully woven rhetoric that has accompanied China's emergence as a global superpower. Although it is often dismissed as shallow propaganda, silver-tongued diplomats in Beijing have skillfully used this diplomatic lexicon to create the illusion that China is the polar opposite of a superpower that acts unilaterally and uses military power to achieve its goals.

Michael Pillsbury, long time China hand who currently advises the Pentagon, has been featured in a front-page story by the unlinkable Wall Street Journal ("Inside Pentagon, A Scholar Shapes Views of China," 8SEP05, A1). He is described as an influential China hawk who listens to what the Chinese defense and political leaders are saying and takes what they say at face value.

Last, and most certainly least, is the vitriolic Thomas Barnett, author of The Pentagon's New Map and blogger. Barnett posts on the WSJ's profile of Pillsbury and accuses Pillsbury of confusing Chinese aspirations and capabilities as was previously seen in analyses of the Soviet Union.

*Note: I refer to Barnett as potty-mouthed because of his tendency to lose his cool and spew forth a stream of expletives whenever anyone, be they Michael Pillsbury or Robert Kaplan (PDF), imply that China might be a threat. He often accuses anyone who sees China's rise as worrying as being a hack in the service of the U.S. Navy, who tries to play up the China threat to gain more funding "[b]ecause Al Qaeda has no submarines." (PNM, 362)

[China] [East Asia]

Blues Trust China, Reject Arms

2005-09-08T07:29:00.000-05:00

The heads of the two main Pan Blue parties, Ma Ying-jeou of the Kuomintang and James Soong of the People First Party, have agreed to oppose the special arms budget requested by the Ministry of National Defense. The ministry recently reduced the size of the arms budget by shifting some weapons to the general military budget in hope of gaining Pan Blue support. According to the China Post, the weapons were rejected because they are

still too expensive, unnecessary and against the people's wishes.

Most amazing about this whole ordeal is a quote from James Soong explaining the decision:

In May, when I went to China, (Chinese President) Hu Jintao clearly said if Taiwan doesn't pursue independence, there won't be any military threat in the Taiwan Strait.

Mr. Soong is taking the word of President Hu that Taiwan needn't fear China and thus doesn't need to buy more sophisticated weaponry. This is baffling to say the least.

For a look at why this weaponry is necessary, see here, even though all of my arguments are apparently negated by a promise or two from Hu Jintao.

Update: I was left so speechless by Soong's comment that I couldn't think of a relevant comparison, but now I am leaning toward Neville Chamberlain saying he could trust Hitler. (Note: I'm comparing Soong to Chamberlain, NOT Hu to Hitler. I despise Hitler comparisons as much as the next guy.)

[China] [Taiwan]

D3m0cr@cy

2005-09-05T22:13:00.000-05:00

A recent speech by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao has left both Asiapundit and Peking Duck wondering if we will soon be able to write the word democracy without the need to use trick letters to get around the firewall.

Premier Wen:

China will press ahead with its development of democratic politics, that is reconstruction, in an unswerving way, including direct elections,

HK Dave over at Simon World, on the other hand, sees this as:

Wen Jiabao, the Premier of China, has made official what we've all suspected; that democracy in China is just a matter of time.

I wouldn't consider this a done-deal just yet. For one thing, Wen was addressing a foreign audience. I wonder how widely this will be reported back in China and how it will be spun.

Additionally, Wen explained that democracy will rise out of local elections, something that many China watchers have been predicting. My understanding of Chinese village elections, which is far from authoritative, is that they work more as a means of validating the party choice or of trying to encourage the party's representative to keep in touch with the people. The people are either denied choices, or the people's choice, upon taking office, slips on the straightjacket of party dictates.

Update: Imagethief asks:

[H]ow many repressive governments have been "in transition to democracy" since roughly the last ice age?

[China] [Democracy]